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Chapter 1 Introduction and Objectives 
The ICT domains (IT- and telecom-specific sectors and other areas of activity affected 
by their development) have always been subject to some degree of technical, economic 
and/or societal regulation. The traditional basis for these interventions was a 
‘governance gap’ between the economically-motivated activities of key stakeholders and 
the external consequences for other firms, end-users, public services, etc. Recent 
changes in market and societal context and policy initiatives such as the Lisbon and 
‘Better Regulation’ agendas have triggered a reconsideration of this basis. Four 
developments in particular are particularly challenging:  
1. enterprise convergence and divergence that reshape market and sector 
boundaries;  
2. the evolution of ‘converged’ regulators along sectoral (e.g. UK) or network-
industry (e.g. Netherlands, Germany) lines; 
3. new regulatory concerns (e.g, Intellectual Property Rights, RFID, net neutrality); 
and  
4. changes in the European policy context (the regulatory framework review, the 
Better Regulation agenda; new directives relating to e.g. online media services, 
etc.). 
These have combined to lay the foundation for crosscutting reviews and rebalancing of 
regulatory roles and responsibilities which can have profound structural and dynamic 
implications. 
From the policy formulation perspective, this changing landscape is recognised in 
requirements for both ex ante and ex post regulatory impact analysis, assessment and 
evaluation. Detailed and concrete procedures have been developed that support a 
balanced view of both the sector-specific and competition-related impacts of regulatory 
(and other) interventions in the ICT domains. But this development has been largely 
confined to formal or statutory regulation, while much of the governance in these 
domains is provided by a spectrum of self- and co-regulatory organisations (hereafter 
referred to as XROs). 
It is therefore timely to consider what sorts of self- and co-regulatory arrangements 
exist, what issues they address, what other impacts they produce and, in general, how 
their existence affects regulatory ‘rethinking’ and assessment. At a minimum, regulatory 
impact analysis needs to take into account: 
 The pre-existence, structure and performance of XROs involving key 
stakeholders and/or addressing the issues addressed by the proposed 
regulation 
 The ongoing role and activities of XROs as part of the context for both ‘laissez-
faire’ and statutory regulation; and 
 The advantages and risks for strategies that seek to achieve regulatory 
objectives through explicit reliance on or support for XROs (e.g. by delegating 
authority, endorsing XRO-produced standards and Codes of Conduct, or 
providing monitoring and enforcement support). 
The research reported in this paper analyses the roles, functions and impacts of these 
organisations in various ICT-related domains and considers their implications for 
developing a regulatory posture that is more supportive of overarching policy objectives, 
more transparent and accountable, more flexible in response to technological and other 
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changes, less burdensome to those regulated and less likely to distort market outcomes 
and evolution. 
Methods and Description 
The research reported here is based on: 
 a review of the literature surrounding self-regulation (in a wide range of 
contexts, including financial services and professional self-regulation),  
 21 extended case studies of Internet XROs (see Appendix),  
 an analytic treatment of the determinants and impacts of XRO formation, 
agenda-setting, rules, monitoring, enforcement and compliance; and 
 a policy analysis of the scope for regulatory engagement with XROs and 
methods option development and ex ante (and to a lesser extent ex post) 
evaluation.  
Particular issues concern:  
 the degree to which XROs are formed around specific issues, market segments, 
personalities or types of action (e.g. standardisation);  
 whether different types of statutory or XRO governance are likely to adopt more 
stringent or more cost-effective rules;  
 whether different arrangements are more vulnerable to capture or corruption;  
 and whether compliance will be higher under specific types of arrangements.  
These can be related to a number of topics of current interest. One is the issue of 
technological neutrality in reallocating market access rights. For instance, new blocks of 
spectrum are currently being allocated (or considered for allocation) for a range of new 
uses from active RFID through WiMax and extensions of mobile broadband. Previous 
experience with e.g. GSM suggested that early standardisation was advantageous (at 
least in European markets) because it encouraged hardware manufacturers to invest in 
GSM-compliant handsets, thus assuring rapid attainment of critical mass. But this 
association of a particular spectral area with a single use also risks crowding out 
superior (or simply different) technologies, and current plans for spectrum allocation in 
e.g. the 2.6GHz band are explicitly technology neutral, allowing both a range of initial 
uses and subsequent trading of licenses if other uses prove more attractive. This creates 
a tension that must be resolved, and the participation of different players in self-
regulation, like their participation in the initial auctions, will play a strong role. 
A second example can be seen in recent calls (in the UK and France) for Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) to monitor and enforce intellectual property rights. The preferred 
mode is a form of co-regulation; ISPs are supposed to do this voluntarily, but face fines 
if they fail to perform this regulatory function. While it may be argued that ISPs are 
best-placed to do this, it is clear that the benefits accrue mainly to content owners. The 
market solution would be a sharing of the gains between the two sides, but this 
potentially conflicts with ‘net neutrality’ proposals to prevent ISPs from discriminating 
on the basis of content. 
European Regulatory Context 
The purpose of this study was to:  
“support policy design and impact assessments by assessing the efficiency, effectiveness 
and sustainability of existing co- and self-regulatory regimes in the field of Information 
Society services and other digital content and applications. The study shall identify the 
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conditions in which co- or self-regulation (initiated or mediated by the EC) could best 
enable innovation in Europe while upholding safety, security and fundamental rights.” 
Individual case studies provided the raw material for this cross-cutting and analytical 
final task. In this report we lay out the intervention logic required to assess the 
individual case studies (with the caveat that the case studies represent a snapshot of 
best and most representative practices in larger Member States). It is apparent that the 
process of establishing self- or co-regulatory organisations (XROs) in this field requires 
a series of policy trade-offs, which are detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. There is no ‘magic 
bullet’ in Internet regulation, and resolving contested policy claims between the moving 
targets of competitiveness and innovation, and public safety and security concerns, is a 
continual political judgement. The benefits of ‘unregulation’ or ‘pre-regulation’ must be 
judged against the maturing of markets and the political judgement of intervention 
logic. 
The regulatory playing field in the European Union (EU) is dynamically evolving. This 
reflects developments in market and societal contexts, as well as a changing political 
context. Particularly in relation to the information and communication technology 
(ICT)-enabled sectors, the identities of key stakeholders, the nature of their 
participation and the spillover impacts onto a broad range of societal and political 
objectives are changing rapidly. The resulting challenges have created strong impetus 
for a fresh look at regulatory engagement. 
Changing Regulatory Agendas 
This dynamic development is reflected in three main agendas.  
Redrawing Regulation 
The first is concerned with regulation itself, and the extent to which regulatory lines of 
action and accountability need to be redrawn in response to (or anticipation of) changes 
arising in the market and society more broadly. Specific examples include the following: 
 the increased need to rethink regulatory strategies applying to transnational or 
global entities and markets; 
 the growing overlap of technical, economic and societal regulatory objectives 
and tools; 
 the need to ‘join up’ regulatory activities arising at different levels of government 
and within different ministries (policy domains); 
 regulation and competitive markets change, but they do not necessarily change 
at the same pace and in the same fashion, thus allowing a growing space for risk 
of inconsistency or incompatibility; 
 regulatory competition among neighbouring jurisdictions; 
 the growth and dynamics of a wide variety of alternatives to formal command-
and-control regulation; and 
 changing needs for regulation, as old rules cease to be relevant and new ones are 
required. 
In the face of these challenges, three general principles emerge to guide regulatory 
change:  
1. regulations and regulatory policy should be adjusted in order to increase efficacy 
(contributions to overarching policy objectives, including remedies for market 
failure);  
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2. burdens of rule-making, enforcement and compliance should be reduced or 
reallocated (changing means – how to regulate the things that are regulated, or how 
to achieve regulatory objectives by choosing whom to regulate); and 
3. adaptability and flexibility in the face of changing circumstances should be 
improved (changing ends – whether to stop regulating something or someone 
because it is no longer necessary, or because the costs (now) outweigh the benefits, 
or whether to start regulating some new activity or area). 
The main implications are the need to survey the range of regulatory or governance 
structures arising outside government and to assess their implications for future 
regulatory strategy as:  
 part of the overall context within which regulation takes place; 
 a potentially more efficient agent of the public interest; and  
 an active partner in responding to the challenge of rapid change.  
These needs find concrete expression in a variety of policy initiatives1 responding to new 
and emergent challenges, many of which envisage (or at least recognise) both the 
importance of self- and co-regulatory solutions and the particular advantages and risks 
posed by reliance on such approaches. 
Better Regulation 
A second, and closely-related, agenda goes under the general heading of ‘Better 
Regulation’. While it stresses some of the same general principles for good regulation 
arising from the regulatory change agenda, it lays particular emphasis on the need to 
assess carefully the impacts of proposed changes in regulations and regulatory 
arrangements. It finds concrete expression in a range of policy documents relating to 
regulation in general2 and specific guidance relating to evaluation and Impact 
Assessment (IA). With reference to alternatives to regulation, key aspects are the need 
to: 
 perform holistic ex ante assessment of impacts; 
 consider relevant alternatives in such assessment; 
 take into account a range of potential impacts (costs, benefits, distributional 
impacts, administrative requirements); and 
 measure and, where possible, monetise such impacts on the basis of sound data 
and analytic methods. 
These general principles are not yet, in general, reflected fully in the state-of-the-art3: 
alternatives are rarely identified, the range of impacts considered is often narrow and 
measurement and monetisation remain relatively underdeveloped, especially in relation 
to self- and co-regulatory initiatives where necessary information may be difficult to 
obtain or validate. Thus there is a need to develop further the implications of self- and 
co-regulation for the practice of IA and to identify ways in which clear and consistent 
principles and practices can be implemented. 
It is important to note that, while the focus of the study is on ex ante assessment of 
alternatives, there are clear implications for both the ex post monitoring and evaluation 
                                               
1 E.g. Recommendation for Protection of Minors and Human Dignity, Safer Internet Action Plan, Electronic 
Communications Framework, Content Online policies, eCommerce Directive, Television without Frontiers (now 
AVMS) Directive, Communication on Computer Crime. 
2 Examples include the European Commission (2002) Better Regulation Action Plan and the 2003 Inter-institutional 
Agreement on Better Regulation. 
3 European Policy Forum (2006), Jacobs (2005, 2006), Torritti (2007). 
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of regulatory performance delivered by self- and co-regulatory initiatives (and by 
regulatory initiatives in a context that includes independent self-regulation), and the 
progressive development of information sources and analytic tools relating to such 
assessments. 
Lisbon Agenda and i2010 
A third, and in many ways overarching, element of context is provided by the EU Lisbon 
Agenda and associated policy initiatives (e.g. the i2010 Policy Framework). The Lisbon 
Agenda establishes macroeconomic and societal goals from which the criteria for 
regulatory strategy and implementation should be derived, and to which the 
contributions of regulatory alternatives (including self- and co-regulation) should be 
assessed. One special area of activity concerns the Information Society, of which Europe 
has devoted an enormous amount of effort and resources to integrated development. 
The Information Society raises particular concerns in relation to self- and co-regulation; 
the policy contexts and market structures in ICT sectors differ strongly from those in 
other contexts, as do the strength and duration of linkages among key participants. 
Thus, while many sectors have developed strong traditions of self-regulation (including 
many professions, financial services and environmental management), it is in ICT that 
self-regulation has developed perhaps the richest variety of forms and tackled perhaps 
the largest range of policy concerns.  
Comparative studies have shown major differences between Europe and, for example, 
the US4, among EU Member States5 and between the European Commission (EC) and 
Member States6 in terms of approaches to self-regulation. This not only reinforces the 
importance of building on the strong lead taken by EU institutions as a way of 
improving the global business climate for European enterprises, but also – critically – 
as a way to ensure that the progress made in tackling regulatory problems within 
Europe is not undone by fragmentation or a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ on the world 
scale. 
Defining Co- and Self-regulation 
Our approach to co- and self-regulation uses the definitions explained most definitively 
in the 2003 Inter-institutional Agreement7. We also note the 2006 Recommendation8 
and Audio Visual Media Services (AVMS) Directive 2007/65/EC at Recital 369: 
“self-regulation constitutes a type of voluntary initiative, which enables the economic 
operators, social partners, non-governmental organisations or associations to adopt 
common guidelines amongst themselves and for themselves … Co-regulation gives, in its 
minimal form, a legal link between self-regulation and the national legislator in 
accordance with the legal traditions of the Member States. Co-regulation should allow 
for the possibility for State intervention in the event of its objectives not being met.” 
                                               
4 Newman and Bach (2004) 
5 Finger and Varone-(2006), Coen (2005), Wilks (2005). 
6 Borraz (2007). 
7 For those actions that require coordinated or joint implementation by the institutions, the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission adopted in 2003 an inter-institutional agreement to provide a stable context for better 
regulation. Its objective is to improve the quality of Community legislation, its accessibility and its transposition into 
national law. The agreement entrenches best practices and sets out new objectives and commitments (cf. note 12). 
8 Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the protection of minors 
and human dignity and on the right of reply in relation to the competitiveness of the European audiovisual and on-line 
information services industry, OJ L378, 27.12.2006, p. 72. 
9  DIRECTIVE 2007/65/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 December 2007 
amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (AVMS Directive) 
OJ L332, 18.12.2007, at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_332/l_33220071218en00270045.pdf. 
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Definitions from the Inter-institutional Agreement 
Co-regulation: “The mechanism whereby a Community legislative act entrusts the attainment of 
the objectives defined by the legislative authority to parties which are recognised in the field 
(such as economic operators, the social partners, NGOs [non-governmental organisations] or 
associations).” 
Self-regulation: “The possibility for economic operators, the social partners, NGOs or 
associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines at European 
level (particularly codes of practices or sectoral agreements).” 
The rules on the functioning of the social dialogue (Articles 138 and 139 of the Treaty  
establishing the European Community) and standardisation according to the ‘New Approach’ are 
not affected by this agreement. 
Co-regulation and self-regulation “will not be applicable where fundamental rights or important 
political options are at stake or in situations where the rules must be applied in a uniform 
fashion in all Member States”. Under co-regulation, following notification of a draft agreement 
prepared by interested parties, the Parliament and the Council will have the right to suggest 
amendments to the agreement, object to its entry into force and, possibly, ask the Commission to 
submit a proposal for a legislative act. As for self-regulation, the Commission will keep the 
legislators informed by reporting on the practices it regards as effective and satisfactory in terms 
of representativeness. 
In general, this study has examined most closely the self-regulatory institutions tending 
towards self-organising10 types – those in which either the market or the individuals in a 
network create rules without a pan-sectoral regulator of either self-, co- or government-
led type. This has permitted a greater richness in exploring ‘emergent’ forms of self-
regulation in conforming to the terms of reference and in helping to map the issues and 
gap analysis required. 
The project has explored fully the place of self- and co-regulation and the classification 
of the 21 empirical case studies (see Appendix). For readability, the range of co- and 
self-regulatory organisations is referred to as XROs in the rest of the report. 
 The Place of the European Union in Self- and Co-regulation 
Four elements reinforce the role of EU institutions in addressing issues arising from the 
practice and assessment of self- and co-regulation: 
 the EU has particular competence in specific policy areas where alternatives to 
regulation can be of particular importance, deriving from the legal base11; 
 the EU has established already a lead role in articulating the Better Regulation 
Agenda, laying out an implementation framework through the Inter-
institutional Agreement on Better Regulation and driving forward progress on 
integrated impact assessment12; 
                                               
10 Latzer, et. al. (2006). 
11 Many of these derive from Treaty articles relating to the Internal Market (esp. Articles 43 and 49) and are further 
elaborated in the European Commission Communication “i2010 – A European Information Society for growth and 
employment” {SEC(2005) 717} at: http://eur-
ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0229:FIN:EN:PDF. 
12 See e.g. the Better Regulation Action Plan (COM(2002)278 final), at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=COM:2002:0278:FIN:EN:PDF. On Impact Assessment, see Communication on Impact Assessment of 5 
June 2002 (COM(2002)276 final), at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0276:FIN:EN:PDF and the Inter-Institutional Agreement 
on Better Lawmaking, at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2003:321:0001:0005:EN:PDF and especially the common approach to integrated impact assessment at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/ii_common_approach_to_ia_en.pdf. 
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 many of the issues raised, in terms of regulatory competence and objectives, and 
of evidence collection and IA, are inherently cross-border; and 
 in recognition of subsidiarity, the most common EU instrument of regulatory 
policy is the Directive, rather than the European Regulation. The use of this 
instrument in areas where self- and co-regulatory alternatives are likely to be 
relevant requires concrete and consistent guidance to implementing Member 
States, in order to avoid policy fragmentation or even conflict that might imperil 
the impacts intended by the Directive and broader European economic and 
social policy goals whose achievement rests on the removal of regulatory and 
market barriers and fragmentation. Although formal mechanisms exist for 
harmonising and reconciling formal regulation in different Member States, they 
may prove to be less effective in relation to self-regulatory institutions.  
Particular subjects for assessment include the contribution of activities under the Better 
Regulation and IA agendas to the efficiency, flexibility, innovativeness and 
competitiveness of the Single Market (in particular impacts on internal barriers to 
entry, dominance and collusion), the position of European firms in the global economy 
and the extension of European perspectives and progress beyond its borders. 
Against this background, we note the explosion of varieties of XROs in ICT-related 
sectors, and the development of both theoretical and applied approaches to 
understanding their genesis and impacts, including self-organisational forms in social 
networks (Bebo), virtual worlds (SecondLife), coordination mechanisms (London 
Action Plan and Internet Governance Forum), and new legal movements (Creative 
Commons). Progress in this area has tended to be driven by external developments, 
historical experience and haphazard application of a variety of conceptual frameworks, 
strategic options and assessment tools. This document is intended to assist the 
integration of policy approaches to XRO options in the particular contexts of EC-level 
activity, ICT-related sectors and issues and ex ante IA. It does this by means of the 
approach described in the following chapter. 
 Approach Taken in the Paper 
The following chapter lays out the evidence base and the detailed analytic framework to 
be followed. In particular, it identifies the various types of case study, the theoretical 
evidence and the policy-related evidence, and the contributions to be expected from 
each. This is translated into a taxonomic framework to organise the evidence and to 
serve as a starting point for the definition, specification and assessment of self- and co-
regulatory alternatives to regulation. It also briefly summarises the main issues and 
methods used in the peer-reviewed and policy-related literatures, concluding with an 
assessment of how these different evidence bases combine to advance the overall goal. 
(The Appendix provides a descriptive summary and analysis of existing arrangements 
organised along the taxonomic dimensions most relevant for regulatory assessment. 
These include structural and conduct descriptions, performance indicators and 
(critically for independent institutions) dynamic forces that shape their origins, 
participation, agenda, activities and future growth. It concludes by drawing lessons for 
the sector-specific and other features that should be taken into account in IA.) 
Chapter 3 builds on these regularities by drawing out results from the peer-reviewed 
and policy literature that either confirm the case study observations or suggest limits to 
their ability to be generalised. The theoretical analysis, which reflects issues arising in 
many national and sectoral contexts, concentrates on the incentives shaping 
participation, enforcement and compliance and identifies key contextual and structural 
parameters. The policy-related literature complements this by identifying particularly 
favourable or unfavourable areas for XROs, and by providing checklists linking good 
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practice to policy areas and objectives. Together, these evidence bases enrich the 
taxonomy provided by the case studies by highlighting the ‘intervention logic’ (channel 
of impact) associated with specific arrangements, the range and potential severity of 
associated risks, key assumptions associated with expected results and criteria for use in 
performance assessment. 
Finally, we integrate these findings to assist the development of logical frameworks for 
IA in relation to self- and co-regulation. It should be noted that the evidence does not 
automatically provide this basis. First, the evidence clearly demonstrates both the wide 
variety of forms that such options take and the apparently close connections between 
these forms and sectoral or national specificities. Second, because XROs arise and/or 
operate at least partially outside government control, they depart in three ways from the 
normal context of IA:  
 they were not necessarily designed to advance public objectives, which are thus 
achieved as a ‘by-product’ of their defining raison d’être (e.g. interoperability as 
a by-product of Internet Engineering Task Force design principles);  
 they often need to rely on voluntary self-interested behaviour for participation 
and compliance, which differentiates their command of resources, scope (who is 
bound by them) and effectiveness from those of similar formal regulatory 
initiatives (an example is the voluntary approach of the German FSM in search 
engine regulation as opposed to the co-regulation of KJM-audited processes);  
 they do not have exclusive power within an integrated legal framework, and thus 
may compete with other self-, co- and formal regulatory bodies or face patchy 
legal underpinnings across their geographic sphere of activity (e.g. industry-led 
hotlines for illegal content). 
As a result, familiar elements of the logical framework such as design and relevance, 
efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability may need careful interpretation, especially 
when comparing self-, co- and formal regulatory alternatives. Thus, this chapter 
includes an elaboration of basic and expanded options that may be relevant, and 
provides guidance as to how to specify the options and associated intervention logic, 
what criteria to apply at each stage, what evidence and indicators to use and what 
additional risks or external factors most affect the assessment. 
As noted above, in many areas such initiatives are already underway. Thus they form 
part of the context for IA, even of formal regulatory approaches. In addition, the specific 
approach chosen and implementation details may strongly influence the assessment. 
Finally, for both evidence-gathering and implementation purposes, wide participation 
from the full range of affected stakeholders is essential. To assist further the 
implementation of the framework suggested in the penultimate chapter, the conclusion 
provides some procedural and conceptual recommendations. These include a road map 
for conducting such assessments, building a ‘self- and co-regulation-aware’ regulatory 
framework, and an expanded discussion of the range and practical implementability of 
criteria that are:  
 common across all options and derived from, for example, the Better Regulation 
Agenda;  
 specific to particular types of organisation or regulatory tool (e.g. codes of 
conduct, standards, certification, voluntary agreement); and  
 reflective of particular sectoral considerations or policy domains (e.g. technical, 
content or quality-of-service). 
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Chapter 2 Analysing Existing and Proposed 
Arrangements 
This chapter draws on the peer-reviewed and policy literature in order to draw out some 
insights into the processes by which XROs are formed, the mechanisms through which 
their effects are produced and the implications for regulation and Impact Assessment 
(IA). As a more theoretical chapter than the empirical Appendix, it raises the issues in 
ideal types of XRO. Together with the Appendix, this chapter leads to a synthesis of 
theoretical and empirical findings in the final main chapter. 
 Drivers of XRO Formation 
The formation, behaviour and impact of XROs develop in response to a range of outside 
drivers. This chapter considers the evolution of such arrangements and develops an 
overview of the implications for EC action in relation to XROs and for IA.  
Normally, XROs come into existence in response to perceptions of some sort of problem 
or challenge that is not effectively addressed by other (e.g. market or government) 
mechanisms. To lead to action, these perceptions must be accompanied by (positive or 
negative) incentives; their focus will significantly affect the development of the XRO. 
We identify four commonly occurring sources of incentives which should be considered 
when interpreting the behaviour of actual XROs or anticipating the results of future 
XRO activity, from: 
 customer (downstream) and supplier (upstream) relationships; 
 peer/rival (horizontal) relationships; 
 relations with formal governance institutions; and 
 other XROs. 
Often, XRO formation is catalysed by a readily identifiable trigger event (e.g. public 
outrage at a report concerning child pornography), but this is not always the case: many 
arise from the slow build-up of pressure to address a minor issue that is expected to get 
worse unless action is taken (e.g. interoperability and other technical issues). Therefore 
we distinguish between trigger events; and trigger pressures. 
The initial impetus may (and frequently does) come from a single individual or 
organisation, but if the XRO is not to be ‘stillborn’, consensus must be achieved at an 
early stage on the need to act (problem-level consensus) and (at least in outline) what 
action is needed (solution-level consensus). 
This equates to Stock’s concept of textual community formation13. The solution-level 
consensus will consolidate into the basic ‘text’ (or code), which may be highly complex, 
procedural as much as textual, dynamic and expressed in many formats. Given this very 
wide understanding of ‘text’, consensus will be enhanced by further ‘buy-in’ until a 
critical mass for implementation is reached. Implementation will (or should) involve the 
active engagement of the members of the community (beyond passive agreement with 
the consensual base). Implementation proceeds in parallel with refinement and/or 
updating of that consensual base, which in due course is likely to highlight additional 
challenges that supplement or supplant the operation of the XRO and require renewed 
consensus building. 
                                               
13 Stock (1993). This work relates to mediaeval literature, but has been widely referenced in studies of development of 
technical bodies e.g. Marvin’s (1998) study of electrical textuality as related to e.g. the American and British Institutes 
of Electrical Engineers, bodies which have quasi-regulatory functions in technical sectors. 
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In the absence of outside (e.g. EC or government) intervention, this evolutionary 
process naturally tends to follow participants’ perceived best interests rather than the 
public interest (although altruism should not be totally discounted – much public good 
derives from voluntary private action). Thus the first point of ‘intervention’ of 
(particularly) the EC in this evolution may come very early, in the form of advice on the 
‘text’ base and brokering consensus around a ‘text’ that reflects the public good. This 
may take the form of consultation with potential XRO participants during the creation 
of the text base (e.g. legal framework), advice as to how to discharge (especially self-
regulatory) responsibilities, or the provision of an overarching policy framework that 
makes specific recommendations as to what responsibilities participants are expected to 
accept and what action may be taken to help or compel this14. 
This simplified evolutionary model of XRO development allows a summary view of its 
relationship with different type of EC intervention and the implied IA, monitoring or 
evaluation requirements, as seen in Figure 4. 
Figure 1: Impact analysis of XROs 
 
                                               
14 A recent example is provided by the UK Department of Culture, Media and Sport consultation document Creative 
Britain: New Talents for the New Economy which, in chapter 5, lays out the expectation that ISPs will cooperate 
voluntarily in the enforcement of IPR and suggests that statutory penalties may be imposed if such self-regulation 
fails. See: http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/096CB847-5E32-4435-9C52-
C4D293CDECFD/0/CEPFeb2008.pdf. 
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Theoretical and Empirical Analytic Models of XRO Operation  
There is an extensive literature on XROs, stemming from experience with specific 
industries (financial services, environmental regulation and professional self-regulation 
in accounting, law, etc.) or widely-participatory self-regulation approaches to corporate 
social responsibility. This literature uses models extensively – models in this sense are 
abstract descriptions of more complex situations, simplified in order to highlight the 
impact of particular features or draw general lessons. The models themselves may be 
conceptual (including verbal descriptions), mathematical (especially those based on 
optimising or strategic behaviour) or empirical (e.g. econometric models used to test 
hypotheses derived from conceptual or mathematical models).  
The literature differentiates situations where XROs serve: 
 general public objectives directly linked to the economic interests of specific 
industry or stakeholder groups (e.g. environmental standards compliance); 
 general public interests not directly linked to industry participants’ interests, but 
which they are best placed to further (e.g. content filtration, privacy); or 
 the interests of specific stakeholder groups threatened by informational or 
strategic market failure (e.g. anti-fraud or quality-of-service). 
These distinctions shed light on the alignment of policy objectives with those of XRO 
participants, and on the likely extent of participation (highest for those participants 
whose interests are directly affected) and compliance (greatest for participants whose 
interests are most closely aligned with the XRO’s collective preferences and/or those 
whose activities can be most easily monitored). These analyses also consider different 
formalisations of self- or co-regulation – especially whether the state initiates, backs or 
threatens the entity and the ‘order of moves’. The analysis generally takes account of 
two effects which combine to determine how such organisations come into existence 
and affect market performance and public interest(s):  
 selection: who chooses to participate and in what way; and 
 incentives: how does the existence and activity of the organisation (and other 
players) affect market behaviour?  
Generally these are subjected to positive analysis of the likely consequences of 
particular arrangements or institutional features. Normative analysis reverses this, 
seeking to identify optimal forms and amounts of self- and co-regulation on the basis of 
identification of the size and incidence of costs and benefits of alternative regimes. Both 
perspectives are relevant for XRO IA:  
 positive analysis provides the expected impacts of both designed and ‘native’ 
XROs; and 
 normative analysis is useful in the specification and design of arrangements.  
Specifically, positive analysis is needed to take accurate account of existing XROs and 
their likely development, while normative analysis is needed for the design and 
specification of XRO-using options. 
Theoretical and econometric models15 also differ in the assumed economic and legal 
context and the capabilities, information and objectives of those involved. Both provide 
relevant evidence and support for policy conclusions, but the nature of this support is 
                                               
15 E.g. Ashby et al. (2004), Bauer and Bohlin (2007), Brunekreeft (2004), DeMarzo et al. (2000, 2005a, 2005b), 
Duncombe and Heeks (2002), Freytag and Winkler (2004), Gehrig and Jost (1995), Joskow and Noll (1999), Lyon 
and Maxwell (2003), Nunez (2007), Pirrong (2001), Polasky et al. (2006), Posner (1971), Priest (1997), Stefanadis 
(2003). 
  
 13
different. The construction and application of such models depends on specific 
structural issues. 
 Who is bound by the regime and who has voice? The processes that determine 
these vary by degree of self-regulation: 
o formal regulation – scope and voice are determined by jurisdiction, 
regulatory relationships (e.g. significant market power) and discretionary 
choice (on both sides); 
o co-regulation (including regulated self-regulation) – scope and voice are 
determined by negotiation or by default; and 
o self-regulation – scope and voice are determined by the nature of the 
industry, the issue(s) considered and existing regulation. Inclusion may 
be determined by an individual firm (voluntary compliance) or 
incumbent members (certification). Different circumstances offer a 
range of defaults such as all-in, opting-in, opting out or ‘equivalent 
performance’16. 
 What are the organisation’s rules, constraints and information strategies? 
 What are the organisation’s monitoring, reporting and enforcement strategy? 
 How – if at all – does the organisation overlap with others in terms of 
membership, objectives and instruments? 
XRO Stakeholders 
For simplicity of exposition, most models limit the range of stakeholders considered 
and relatively few examine the consequences of excluding or limiting the voice of 
particular classes – the others are not modelled explicitly17. The interest groups whose 
behaviour and interests are considered include:  
 individual firms – e.g. AOL, Bebo or Yahoo!;  
 the industry – the constituency of the organisation, the market segment in which 
its members operate and/or upstream or downstream firms or customers;  
 government – typically considered as a single entity; and  
 society at large – often represented by civil society stakeholders.  
XRO Objectives 
In general it is common for models to assume that XROs strive to advance the economic 
interests of their members, taking into account any subsequent market competition, 
government activity, etc. However, there are some exceptions, in which the 
organisation’s objectives include:  
 protecting the interests of third parties (not customers);  
 the exercise of vertical power – e.g. activities such as standardisation which 
coordinate behaviour with common suppliers;  
 the prevention, pre-emption or subversion of formal regulation;  
 the accumulation of political or regulatory influence through public-spirited 
action; and  
                                               
16 For instance, if a standard is strengthened by reference in dispute resolution (e.g. court) or procurement 
specifications, under some circumstances a firm can avoid sanction by demonstrating equivalent performance. 
17 In exactly the same way, industrial models consider the strategic behaviour of firms explicitly, but treat customers 
as a simple ‘demand curve’. 
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 positive reputation impacts in the market (the ‘warm glow’ objective). 
More generally, XROs have two broad classes of operational objectives:  
 the maintenance (and/or increase) of consensus; and  
 specific operations in terms of the defined problems or challenges.  
These objectives interlink. If the implementation of the proposed solution is inefficient 
or ineffective (or if it is effective to the extent of closure), then consensus will fade. This 
necessitates continuing review and modification and possible extension into new areas, 
and may be influenced by competition or cooperation between XROs. 
Information Asymmetry 
In the simplest type of theoretical and empirical models, it is assumed that there are no 
asymmetries of information. In simple terms, this means that both formal regulators 
and XRO members have the same information about the costs and benefits of different 
rules. In this case, the key is coordination: the efficient alignment of powers to act with 
incentives and the minimisation of administrative, operational and compliance costs. In 
other words, it depends on whether the authorities or the industry players have superior 
relevant information and the degree to which XRO participants’ objectives are aligned 
with public interest(s). 
Where industry participants and other XRO members have superior information, the 
question for the authorities is whether their incentives will lead them to create and 
appropriately enforce the same rules that the public authorities would choose if they 
had the same information. In this ‘principal-agent’ situation, the authorities have to 
trade off the benefits of incorporating participants’ superior information against the 
costs of inducing them to disclose it (or equivalently, the costs of providing suitable 
incentives to participate in the XRO and follow its rules). 
In other cases, the authorities may have superior information – for instance, when 
regulation in a particular domain has cross-cutting effects on a range of public 
objectives, or when the scope of regulation may be affected by impending policy 
changes. Even so, self- or co-regulation may be appropriate if the XRO can avoid the 
deadweight costs of statutory regulation or can monitor and enforce rules more 
effectively or efficiently. In such cases, the authorities should consider the ways in 
which their approach to the XRO (the latitude or resources they provide, or the powers 
they delegate) convey an adequate signal of their superior information. 
The possibility of effective self- or co-regulation also depends on the alignment of 
interests; the degree to which the benefit sought represents a public good and whether 
the pattern of property rights assures that those whose actions affect the outcome are 
affected by the result. In general, more inclusive organisations should be more efficient, 
but this is limited by the transaction costs of wide membership and the risk that the 
organisation can be used for selfish (e.g. anti-competitive) purposes – either of these 
can outweigh the delivered benefit. In such public good situations (where the parties 
agree on the regulatory framework), formal regulatory approaches can achieve the same 
results, reducing the comparative impact analysis to two dimensions: the operating cost 
of the organisation, and the impact of the organisation’s composition on its regulatory 
activity18. 
However, most situations likely to arise involve some degree of information asymmetry 
and thus raise questions of:  
                                               
18 An industry self-regulatory body will give priority to members’ interests; a government body presumably will put 
more weight on customers’ and/or citizens’ interests (see Gehrig and Jost, 1995). For a comparison between for-profit 
and non-profit self-regulatory bodies, see Pattberg (2005). 
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 how the organisation can invite the participation of key stakeholders and get 
them to share their knowledge; 
 how compliance can be monitored by the organisation; 
 government supervision; 
 customers and others; and 
 the degree to which enforcement actions and sanctions can be observed (and 
acted on) by other stakeholders. 
Finally, how can outside observers monitor the degree to which the organisation serves 
other (e.g. commercial) objectives or facilitates other (e.g. anti-competitive) actions? 
These issues sharply affect the efficiency and credibility of the organisation’s operations. 
More importantly, they affect stakeholders’ confidence and trust in the organisation and 
thus the extent to which it supports good governance more broadly. 
Information asymmetries raise a further set of evaluative questions. 
 What are the available trade-offs among regulatory cost, stringency of rules and 
levels of compliance? 
 What is the ‘best’ outcome when stakeholders disagree? 
 Externalities: to what extent are those affected by self- or co-regulatory activities 
engaged in rule-making or implementation? 
 What public goods do the activities provide in terms of:  
o feedback up the value chain to the organisation and thence to 
government; 
o reputation effects (of individual firm compliance for industry at large); or 
o voluntary provision by members of public goods and services, especially 
those not tradable on markets? 
Most models focus on only one aspect of the analysis. The balance of this chapter briefly 
reviews some results in relation to rule formation (of quality standards), entry (to the 
organisation) and competing XROs. It then develops in more detail some of the analysis 
and key findings relating to an issue that has been highlighted as a pervasive weak spot 
in many regulatory IAs, even of formal regulation: compliance19. 
Rule formation: quality standards provide both collective incentives (industry 
reputation effects) and divergent individual incentives (firms wishing to appear better 
than other firms if customers are well informed about compliance, or wishing to 
economise on compliance costs if customers are poorly informed). The propensity to 
form a self-regulatory quality standards body is inversely related to the scale of ex ante 
monitoring costs and the number of potential members. Without informational 
asymmetries between market participants and government officials, self-regulatory 
outcomes can always be replicated by statutory regulation20, albeit with: 
 possibly higher costs; 
 different market distortions and dynamic effects (e.g. for innovation); and 
 different (and possibly lower) possibilities of regulatory ‘capture’ by producers. 
                                               
19 Failures of compliance arise directly from the difficulty of observing (and thus controlling) the behaviour of XRO 
members. 
20 Gehrig and Jost (1995: 311). 
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However, even if firms are better informed than government regulators, self-regulation 
is only socially optimal if the regulator values firm profits sufficiently highly. These 
results suggest that self-regulation can be encouraged by public monitoring 
information, that it is most likely to emerge in concentrated industries where the danger 
of anti-competitive behaviour is greatest, and that it is more likely to be optimal in less 
globalised industries (where the competitiveness of domestic firms is reflected in 
regulatory objectives). 
Entry: if decisions to admit new members to an XRO are made by existing members, 
they will reflect ‘downstream’ competition. On the one hand, if the new members are 
likely to change the rules chosen by the organisation or if membership gives privileged 
market access (e.g. in cases of certification), then entry will be too restricted from a 
social point of view. On the other hand, if all members are bound by the chosen rules 
and if their membership does not affect the choice of rules, entry to XRO may be too 
broad from a social point of view, in effect creating a platform for collusion. 
Competition among self-regulatory organisations: in many cases, multiple 
organisations develop and promulgate standards, provide certification, notify the 
authorities or the public of incidents and carry out other regulatory functions. The 
overall impact on the market depends on the degree to which such competition affects 
the breadth of membership and the stringency of rules21. The key evaluative question is: 
when is there enough competition to induce efficient self-regulation? The analytic 
approaches resemble those used to model regulatory competition and regulatory 
entrepreneurialism, but take into account the added ‘bonus’ of market power. These 
analyses and associated empirical studies have shown that in general, direct 
competition among self-regulatory bodies is too weak and leads to potential confusion 
and conflicting standards. However, the threat of competition by rival self-regulators or 
government is often beneficial. 
Compliance: Most XROs lack statutory enforcement power, which raises the question, 
why would members comply? In analysing this issue, it is important to recognise that 
the organisation and its members get different (but nonetheless real) payoffs to passing 
rules and to enforcing them22. The analysis described here concentrates on compliance 
and applies to both the ‘final stage’ of pure self-regulation and co-regulated situations of 
delegated enforcement. 
A simple model can be used23 to analyse self-regulatory enforcement policy.  
 How likely are XROs to investigate? 
 What penalties or reporting arrangements will they choose?  
 To what extent will the results agree with customers’ preferences?  
In this setting, an XRO chooses a rule and an enforcement policy (probability of 
investigation, contingent penalty). Members compete for customers taking this policy as 
given, and the organisation anticipates this when choosing a rule to maximise its 
members’ collective profit. In this way, the organisation blunts downstream competition 
by choosing a policy that is too lax from the consumers’ perspective. Indeed, if the 
organisation is risk-neutral it will behave as a monopolist. In particular, compared to 
the optimum, investigations are ‘too rare’, although penalties may be adequate (on 
paper). The mechanism is that compliance can be induced either by the ‘carrot’ of 
gainsharing with customers or the ‘stick’ of investigation. The organisation’s members 
naturally prefer the carrot. The weaker the policy, the more customers will offer in 
exchange for compliance.  
                                               
21 In principle, such competition also affects levels of compliance, but this has not been analysed extensively to date. 
22 Of course, the same can be said of formal regulatory bodies. 
23 For related analysis, see e.g. DeMarzo et al. (2000, 2005a, 2005b) and Krarup (1999).  
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A reduction in investigation cost (e.g. by public monitoring) can actually make 
enforcement activity less likely. In an echo of the earlier analysis of competition among 
self-regulators, the level of enforcement will rise as alternatives to the XRO improve. In 
some cases, customers can bundle their choice of a self-regulator with their choice of the 
goods and services offered by its members (as in the case of competing standards or 
certificates). If the offers mediated by different XROs are not perfect substitutes, both 
enforcement and customer power increase with the number of XROs.  
The basic insight is that competition among firms in the end-user market may need to 
be complemented by competition in the ‘governance market’ if the anti-competitive 
potential of self-regulatory choice of enforcement policy is to be avoided. 
Winners and Losers in XROs 
In terms of who benefits, lax enforcement obviously enhances the market power (rents) 
of agents who might gain by non-compliance. Thus firms with market power are less 
likely to form such organisations unless their dominance already brings regulatory 
scrutiny. If violations of its rules occur further down the value chain, the organisation 
may choose to direct enforcement to other layers24. If those layers are competitive, the 
affected downstream players would not benefit (collectively) from lax enforcement and 
thus would not try (through their participation in the XRO to loosen the policy. Thus, 
‘downward’ enforcement may be more efficient than ‘horizontal’. 
Dynamic Implications 
The analysis can be extended to draw out its dynamic implications. Firms may comply 
in order to raise their individual reputations or to realise operating cost, interoperability 
and efficiency savings. However, compliance also brings collective benefits in the form 
of the reputation of industry as a whole, the possibility to pre-empt or reduce the 
burdens of formal regulation and the possibility to enact guidelines more appropriate to 
industry-specific conditions. 
This divergence between individual and collective benefits introduces a possibility of 
‘free-riding’: sometimes, firms benefit from others’ compliance for some types of 
issue25; in other cases, they suffer as a result of others’ compliance26. Similar 
considerations apply to the initial choice of rules – compliance costs differ with firm 
size, prominence, location, etc.  
The evaluative question is: is such ‘free-riding’ a barrier to self-regulation or only to 
successful self-regulation? The answer turns on whether enforcement actions are 
interpreted by the market as bad news (there was non-compliance) or good news (the 
rules are being enforced). This, in turn, depends on what customers (and others) 
already know, for example, from public monitoring or competing self-regulatory 
organisations. Similarly, when assessing the flexibility and adaptability of self-
regulation, it is appropriate to ask whether a change of standards or rules will be seen as 
good or bad news. 
More broadly, if compliance is monitored externally and investigation costs are high, it 
is optimal for the XRO to carry out no enforcement at all. However, if investigation 
costs are low and the organisation punishes non-compliance by withdrawing 
certification (as with effective Trustmark schemes), the policy chosen will be just strong 
enough to pre-empt outside incentives to monitor compliance. In this case, mandatory 
membership in an XRO can benefit firms and damage customers’ interests. Without 
such a requirement in a static world, no one would do business with a firm that did not 
belong to the relevant XRO. In a dynamic setting, non-member firms would get 
                                               
24 Examples include content controls by ISPs, insurance industry fraud regulation. 
25 Or suffer from their non-compliance – see the ‘Assurance Game’ below. 
26 At least in relative terms – see the ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’ compliance race below. 
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business on the strength of their reputations. Mandatory membership would eliminate 
this and thus preserve rents under the XRO ‘umbrella’. 
An alternative to self-regulatory competition and customer monitoring is for the 
government to monitor and step in if compliance ‘fails’. In the face of this threat, the 
XRO’s enforcement will tighten up by just enough to deter such intervention, to the 
extent that costs permit. This comforting conclusion may fail in cases where the 
government regulator is vulnerable to capture, or where differences among the XRO 
members makes them prefer the government ‘stick’.  
Compliance Taxonomy 
A second analysis of the compliance issues considered in chapter 027 can be used to 
develop a taxonomy of situations in which different levels of compliance may be 
reasonably anticipated. It uses a simple game theory model to illustrate the different 
games that firms and government can play in deciding the role of XROs. The basic game 
involves the government deciding how ‘co-regulatory’ the regime is, with members of 
the XRO choosing independently the extent of their compliance with XRO rules. 
In this model, the government can choose between:  
 a strict regime in which the government will step in (either by taking on the 
enforcement of XRO-derived rules or by replacing the XRO with formal 
regulation) unless full compliance is achieved); or  
 a permissive regime of tolerating a modest level of non-compliance in exchange 
for the other advantages of self-regulation.  
The members of the XRO choose (independently) whether to comply. This gives rise to 
a range of different possibilities, which depend on the relative benefits and costs of 
compliance to members. In applying this taxonomy, information about these costs and 
benefits (derived from economic and policy analysis) can be used to predict the 
effectiveness of the combined co-regulatory/XRO regime and, on this basis, to assess 
the benefits and risks associated with looser co-regulation. The alternatives are 
simplified (‘strict’ vs. ‘permissive’ regime, two XRO members, stark choice between 
compliance and non-compliance) for clarity and simplicity – the basic approach can be 
applied in more general situations. Note that the analysis as presented in Figure 5 
concentrates on the interests of the XRO members, as it is these that determine their 
level of compliance. To determine the appropriate government stance, it is necessary to 
analyse (in the specific situation under consideration) the impact of full, partial or non-
compliance on the public interest. These ‘government payoffs’ are omitted in the 
interests of simplicity. 
The main possibilities are illustrated in Figure 2. In this figure, the government’s choice 
is depicted as the first branch, while the second branch identifies (qualitatively distinct) 
cost and benefit arrangements. The combination of these factors determines the 
environment within which XRO members make their compliance choices as shown in 
the matrices in the bottom tier of the figure. In each matrix, each firm chooses whether 
or not to comply; the combination of these choices determines the payoff (profit level) 
for each firm. By convention, the firm that chooses the row (column) receives the first 
(second) payoff of the pair in the given row and column. Equilibrium prevails when 
neither firm can improve its payoff by unilateral change of strategy, and a Pareto (or 
social) optimum is a situation from which any change (whether unilateral or bilateral) 
will make at least one firm worse off. In Figure 2, the equilibria are shaded and Pareto 
optima are shown in bold type – Pareto optimal equilibria are shaded blue. 
                                               
27 This is based on Ashby et al. (2004). 
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Figure 2: A typology of self-regulatory compliance 
 
Under the “Strict regime” above, firms are indifferent between unilateral and 
multilateral defection, since either will bring the weight of government enforcement; 
and unilateral compliance is the worst outcome, since the complying firm incurs the 
costs of compliance without the benefits of self-regulation. There are two possibilities 
for this ‘Assurance Game’28. 
1. 1. If compliance costs are low relative to benefits, the XRO members prefer full 
compliance (e.g. advertising standards). 
2. 2. If compliance costs are too high, the government has to introduce regulation. 
Note that the strict regime gives relatively little scope for differentiated compliance. As 
mentioned above, whether this is essential will depend on the degree to which vital 
public interests are threatened by partial (non-)compliance. Under the ‘Tolerant 
regime’, partial compliance can be enough to sustain self-regulation. The possibilities 
are as follows. 
1. If the reputation benefit of compliance for individual firms (showing leadership) 
outweighs the benefit to the industry as a whole, the result is the game known as 
‘Chicken’, in which unilateral and multilateral compliance are preferred to complete 
breakdown, but where only partial compliance is to be expected (e.g. ISP content 
regulation). 
2. If the costs of unilateral compliance lie between the benefits of full compliance and 
those of individual compliance, the result produces a collective action problem in 
which each XRO member is tempted to free-ride on the compliance activities of the 
others (benefiting from a combination of industry reputation and deterring 
statutory regulation. This produces a form of ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’ in which 
compliance is likely to be very low. However, the fact that this outcome is worse for 
all firms than full compliance implies that the XRO will seek to extend its powers of 
enforcement (e.g. via internal quid pro quo rewards for past compliance). 
3. If compliance costs are so high and reputation affects so weak that neither 
individual nor industry benefits are sufficient to sustain compliance, there will again 
be very little compliance – in this case, the XRO will not seek to extend its powers of 
                                               
28 Maitland (1985). 
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compliance or enforcement and will remain a ‘hollow’ XRO (e.g. Trustmarks and 
Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA) labelling). 
Suggested Framework for Developing Intervention Logic for XRO Analysis 
The following framework, derived from the summary of the peer-reviewed literature 
and the considerations developed in chapter 0 in particular, collects in ‘checklist form’ 
some of the basic elements needed to identify the mechanisms through which XROs 
produce impacts in order to take them into account in IA. It should be seen as 
supplementary to the consideration of the organisation as ‘regulation by other means’. 
For that reason, the list starts with the typical actions available to an XRO (which 
generally differ from those available to formal regulators), the effect exerted by the 
organisation on its environment and a final consideration of the degree to which the 
division of responsibility (or ‘liability’) and the possibility of negotiation among XROs 
or their members may lead to a departure from optimal results.  
The strategies available to the XRO deal with all or some of the following areas: 
 membership – whether the scheme is open or restricted, whether its rules are 
applied only to members, whether competing schemes have overlapping 
memberships or subject areas; 
 competition – whether XRO schemes face (real or potential) competition from 
other schemes or regulatory organisations; 
 how rules are chosen (voting, comments mechanism, etc.) – ‘rules for making 
rules’ affect how public, private and organisation interest are balanced. The key 
point is that public sector regulators represent the public interest and are bound 
by strict conditions of neutrality and responsibility to specific constituencies that 
may be difficult to discharge29. The evaluative question is how the balancing of 
these interests by the XRO differs from, or interacts with, the balancing that 
would be undertaken by a public regulator; 
 relation with government – this includes the threat of government pre-emption 
or intervention, government assistance or delegation, capture of or by 
government, government supervision and bargaining with government over 
rules, changes to the institutional set-up or other policies of interest to the 
members; 
 which rules are chosen – how is the stringency of rules chosen by the XRO likely 
to differ from that of the regulatory option; 
 flexibility – how easily, how fast and in which direction will the XRO’s rules 
change in response to new developments or past successes; 
 costs – how will the organisation affect administrative cost, compliance cost, 
distortion cost (regulatory deadweight loss and other impacts on market 
efficiency) and rule-making cost, and how will these costs be distributed across 
stakeholders; 
 compliance – what does the XRO do to ensure compliance and with what effect; 
what are the policy and economic consequences of non-compliance; and 
 monitoring and enforcement – what information does the XRO collect, how is it 
used and with whom is it shared. 
                                               
29 E.g. in globalised markets; where specific non-public information is needed; or where regulatory decisions 
intermediate between entrenched and opposed interests. 
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XROs produce impacts through a variety of channels or effects, which may be relevant 
in assessing their impacts: 
 coordinating effect – the XRO serves as a platform for exchange of information 
and coordination of action among participating stakeholders; 
 direct effect – the XRO designs suitable rules and enforces (more or less) 
efficient compliance; 
 competitive effect – the activities of the XRO affect market entry, market shares 
and overall demand (e.g. through reputation effects), rates of profit, investment 
and location of economic activity, etc. Note in this connection a potential two-
way classification of interests; 
 shared interest – the interests of participants completely coincide, and the XRO 
serves as a coordinating device; its deliberations and decisions are (or can be 
made) largely self-enforcing. This arises where the reputation of the industry (or 
XRO) as a whole is paramount and/or where public and XRO interest are 
aligned, e.g. in respect of harmful or illegal content; 
 competitive interest – the interests of the parties are partially aligned; they have 
a shared interest in maximising the value of the market, but within that frame 
each wants to maximise its own share of the benefits (‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’); and 
 dynamic effect – the XRO serves to attract other parties, stakeholders and policy 
issues30. In a negative sense, this includes ‘policy creep’ and XRO ‘bloat’ (if too-
wide or too-diverse membership reduces XRO efficiency or effectiveness 
through slowed or weakened rule-making or through ‘free-riding’). In a positive 
sense, it can internalise policy and other externalities, strengthen joined-up 
governance and lead to faster and more comprehensive improvement of XROs. 
The implications can be seen in relation to a ‘societal’ XRO charged with defining and 
implementing a code of conduct that does not directly affect its members’ economic 
interests. If the collective interest (e.g. the reputation of the industry) is paramount31, 
the result will be a shared-interest situation. This does not guarantee an optimal 
outcome, but once chosen, rules will be self-enforcing. If compliance costs are high (for 
some parties) relative to expected losses following non-compliance, they can be 
expected to ‘free-ride’ on the good behaviour of others. The evaluation question is 
whether the impact of this level of non-compliance outweighs the savings due to XRO32. 
On the other hand, if reputation rewards to good behaviour are strong33 the chosen 
rules may spark an ‘arms race’ of over-compliance, which can work against those with 
high compliance costs and exceed socially optimal levels34. 
This is seen simply by applying Coasian35 analysis. On the one hand, if bargaining (rule-
setting and compliance enforcement) is costless, any XRO that includes all affected 
parties will give optimal results. On the other hand, if bargaining costs are too high, the 
XRO will undersupply the public good of compliance. If compliance costs are too low for 
some participants, compliance will be oversupplied relative to the collective decision – 
this may be good if the XRO excludes key classes of beneficiaries, but bad otherwise. 
                                               
30 Particularly those affecting members or falling within their competence to affect. 
31 In the sense that weak rules or non-compliance will lower everyone’s profits. 
32 Several observers having warned against letting administrative costs (quantified via e.g. the Standard Cost Model) 
dominate integrated IAs to the exclusion of harder-to-quantify policy, compliance and non-compliance costs. 
33 Or if some members have particularly low compliance costs due to e.g. pre-existing practice, market location, 
customer profiles or prior IPR. 
34 For instance, if content controls or quality of service standards exceed societal willingness to pay or foreclose 
customer access to a range of services, the result could be static inefficiency or choking off of signals for change.  
35 Coase (1960), Grajzl and Murrell (2007), Krarup (1999), National Consumer Council (2003), Newman and Bach 
(2004). 
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Finally, if the total liability of the participants exceeds the total societal cost, XRO 
bargaining will again lead to over-compliance. For example, this can happen when the 
XRO attracts public attention or when ‘failure’ threatens to trigger inefficient or 
punitive public regulation. 
 General Advantages, Disadvantages and Risks Associated with XROs 
The evidence base identifies a range of general advantages of XRO options compared to 
formal regulation, as well as disadvantages and potential risks. This chapter briefly 
recaps these as an aid to option choice (providing issues for a strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis). 
Advantages 
The advantages may be grouped according to the impact mechanism through which 
they accrue. It can be hoped that such arrangements lead to greater commitment and 
buy-in by stakeholders because: 
 self-regulation – and membership in such a body – can generate a sense of 
ownership of the regulatory process among the profession or industry and thus 
is more likely to secure a high level of compliance; 
 the possibility that self-regulation by an industry may reinforce feelings of 
commitment, pride and loyalty within a profession or industry – and thus 
enhance the ability of the industry to deliver public objectives; 
 self-regulation can harness the common interest of participants in maintaining 
the reputation of those involved in the activity or the reputation of the industry, 
adding to participation and compliance incentives; and 
 the quality of the rules chosen and the balance of responsibilities between 
different parts in the value chain can be strengthened to the extent that the 
organisation is able to harness existing close relationships e.g. between the 
industry/profession and their clients. 
Compliance is strengthened in other ways: 
 rules promulgated by an XRO may have greater credibility because they are 
based on better information, involve the most concerned parties and come from 
a collective body well-suited to internalising externalities through bargaining 
rather than adversarial methods;  
 the greater discretion often available to such bodies allows them to develop and 
implement innovative inducements for compliance and sanctions for non-
compliance; 
 a frequent advantage, which is strongly reflected in the Better Regulation 
Agenda, is the possibility of reduced cost. This can be expected in various ways; 
 a net reduction in state costs associated with regulation, through the presumed 
greater efficiency of a well-founded XRO – these costs include rule-making, 
organisational, monitoring and enforcement costs; 
 a shift of state costs to other parties via the transfer of functions to the self-
regulatory body or through sharing costs with a co-regulatory body; 
 a net reduction in business costs through more efficient rule-making and other 
functions, better designed and targeted rules and shorter (and often less formal) 
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accountability and compliance mechanisms. These costs include rule-making 
cost36 and compliance cost; and 
 a reduction in the overall regulation cost on the industry or economy, sometimes 
referred to as ‘regulatory deadweight loss’. This reduction is due to the adoption 
of more efficient and effective rules, and accrues as a result of increased market 
efficiency and the reduction of external costs associated with the sanctioned 
behaviour or harm. 
A further strength of self- and co-regulatory arrangements results from their flexibility. 
It is generally believed that self-regulation offers enhanced flexibility, responsiveness 
and speed of implementation and modification. It is usually the case that it is quicker to 
establish or change such arrangements compared to statutory regulation, although this 
can diminish with the size and scope of membership and the range of interests 
represented. In addition, many such arrangements offer faster redress than 
conventional regulation. These advantages are obviously stronger in rapidly-changing 
environments and in relation to stakeholders with less ability to bear the consequences 
of administrative delays – including the need to do business under obsolete or 
irrelevant regulations. Finally, the very credibility and effectiveness of regulations may 
be undermined if they do not adapt to changing technological, market and social 
conditions. This can have spill-over impacts on related regulations as well. 
Behind many of these advantages lies one that is valued in its own right: the 
engagement of specific forms of expertise and knowledge in the regulatory process. In 
general, the knowledge and expertise of all involved parties may be used more 
effectively – this may be particularly important where the organisation’s members know 
more about the industry than government officials. This can result in rules that are 
tailored to specific needs and thus are better targeted, more effective and proportionate. 
In addition, the hoped-for improvement in information flows, using clearer terms, 
should enhance the sustainability of the contributions made by the self-regulatory 
regime to broader objectives. In comparison to formal regulation centred on a close and 
sustained (if often adversarial) relationship between the regulator and a few regulated 
suppliers, self-regulation – particularly if it involves customer participation – is likely to 
be more responsive to consumer needs. In some areas it may be disproportionately 
expensive or difficult for government to acquire the specialist knowledge necessary to 
regulate effectively. 
Finally, attention is often drawn to two more general advantages that can enhance the 
impact and sustainability of sector governance. Where the body is concerned with 
social (as opposed to technical or economic) regulation, its activities may improve 
corporate governance and reporting and strengthen the industry’s ability to address 
issues such as corporate social responsibility and ethical trading. In relation to the 
competitiveness objectives of the Lisbon agenda, it may further be noted that ‘Better 
Regulation’ – as achieved, for instance, through XROs – may improve market 
functioning by overcoming market or conduct failures and preventing harms to, for 
example, the consumer and the environment. This is more likely to the extent that 
regulators and market participants have consistent views of the issues arising. 
Disadvantages 
The disadvantages may be grouped also – although less numerous than the advantages 
cited, they may be equally serious in some cases. The most frequently-cited 
disadvantage is the danger to competition: 
                                               
36 While participation may be more costly than interaction with a statutory regulator for firms currently operating 
under ‘light-touch’ regulation or in the regulatory slipstream of a regulated dominant firm, this may well be offset by 
rules that reflect their interests more directly. 
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 if the organisation controls the right to do business in either a formal sense 
(through delegated licensing power or registration) or an informal sense 
(through certification or ‘ownership’ of dominant standards), it may be able to 
prevent entry; 
 other rules potentially allow organisations to restrict advertising, effectively 
coordinate prices or foreclose the profits of those entering ‘downstream’ sectors; 
 even open standardisation can inhibit competition, if it limits the scope of 
consumer choice (‘gold-plating’); and 
 where entry can be restricted on consumer protection grounds, the same power 
may be used to prevent competition or discipline industry members. 
Another disadvantage is the possible failure of the XRO to ensure compliance; 
 the body may lack effective sanctions or the information necessary to verify non-
compliance; 
 ‘fringe’ or ‘rogue’ operators may choose not to comply and it may not be cost-
effective for the organisation to monitor or enforce sanctions against them, 
particularly when the rules, codes or standards are hard to verify; and 
 it may not be worthwhile to enforce the compliance of small operators; 
conversely, dominant operators may not face a credible threat of enforcement 
action. 
An additional disadvantage is possible lack of clarity: 
 consumers (and others) may be confused about the level of compliance to expect 
or the consequences of dealing with non-complying or non-participating firms; 
 the possibility of consumer confusion is magnified when the industry is unable 
to agree on a single code or standard; 
 consumers may be unaware of who or what is covered by the rules, or of past 
enforcement (e.g. suspension) actions by the XRO – in this way, the market 
discipline backing voluntary self-regulation is weakened; and 
 even businesses may become confused about the existence of regulatory 
requirements and which one(s) to follow. 
Finally, there are concerns about the degree to which such bodies are willing and able to 
adhere to standard principles of good regulation, such as: transparency, 
accountability, targeting, proportionality and consistency: 
 the body may lack the resources or capacity to develop and operate a high-
quality scheme or may be unwilling to be open and transparent about its 
processes and outcomes; 
 waning interest and participation, or the establishment of a scheme to pre-empt 
formal regulation may have produced a hollow or ‘Potemkin’ regulator; and 
 even without these failures of better regulation, there may be a general lack of 
public confidence in the ability of, or the incentives for, a self-regulatory body to 
provide effective protection and to impose appropriate sanctions when rules are 
broken. 
Specific XRO Risks 
In addition to these concrete advantages and disadvantages, some policy 
documents make reference to specific risks attached to self- and co-regulatory 
arrangements. These include: 
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 the need for such schemes to meet (and be seen to meet) statutory objectives; 
 the need to attain (and demonstrate) effective performance – often a very 
difficult task, given the huge diversity in the form of such schemes; 
 the need for effective systems and processes of transparency and public 
accountability; 
 the risk of ‘regulatory creep’, as government increases its involvement in 
schemes that start out as self-regulation; 
 the risk of ‘agenda creep’, as the scheme’s members begin to use it to address 
other issues whose resolution may adversely affect the public interest; and 
 the possibility that schemes may arise simply in order to shift compliance costs 
from government to industry, or the converse possibility (for co-regulatory 
arrangements) that the organisation may co-opt government support in order to 
restrain competition or impose market discipline. 
Conclusions  
The analysis in this chapter leads us to a set of policy strategy alternatives, intended to 
frame better the logic of enquiry in IA into the evaluation of the following questions. 
 Under what conditions does XRO seem to work/not work?  
The case studies considered have largely been examples of best practice, where either 
market buy-in was created with active participation, or government stepped in to 
correct market failure by creating a new organisation which acted as a de facto or de 
jure monopoly over market formation. 
 What kinds of structure or arrangement have arisen and in what 
contexts?  
This issue of organisational form is a much more difficult issue, as different corporate 
governance arrangements have been instituted in different XROs, even where their 
ostensible purpose was similar. Therefore it is not possible to conclude that government 
or civil society advisory boards, or a separate funding council, are necessary or sufficient 
for good governance. For instance, in the standards field, directly contradictory models 
have been used. 
 Are there reasons to expect systematic contributions to or 
departures from ‘optimal’ self-regulation?  
The question of how much variety in regulatory form there can be without jeopardising 
success is one in which case studies support a literature on diversity of regulatory form. 
German and British responses to similar crises have produced divergent outcomes, both 
in rhetorical support for co- or self-regulation, and often in different practical solutions 
supporting these different regulatory philosophies, as seen in the formation of the KJM 
as a co-regulatory supervisor in Germany, whereas thus far the UK industry has resisted 
successfully political pressure to introduce legislative supervision of the XROs studied. 
The Netherlands and Spanish examples, and evidence from Scandinavian, Italian and 
French interviewees, support this ‘cultures of regulation’ approach. However, minimum 
harmonisation on methods and standards has been seen to be effective in ventures such 
as W3C, PEGI and INHOPE. 
 How can we know – and what other information ideally would we 
need?  
It is facile but true that a single country, single sector analysis is incomplete for 
evaluation purposes. Evidence gathered for the IA of single policies demands a 
comparative analysis, and in the case of a dynamic interrelated set of policies, such as 
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those for Internet content, services and applications, a far larger survey is needed. In 
the 1990s, the DG INFSO Legal Advisory Board provided a forum for such examination. 
More recently, with the expansion in EU members and legislative proposals, 
contemporary information has been gathered through survey of government members. 
A combination of such approaches may be the most effective response to the ongoing 
mapping of regulatory alternatives required. 
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Chapter 3 Policy Alternatives and Impact 
Assessment Strategies 
In this chapter, we collect guidance for use in preparing the evaluation of self- and co-
regulatory options. The preparation proceeds in stepwise fashion: 
 
More concretely, the process begins with a consideration of general policy in the area 
under consideration, reflecting the state of play and methodological maturity of the 
sector and issue in relation to the Lisbon, Better Regulation and Impact Assessment 
(IA) Agendas. This is not a static analysis, but should be placed in the context of a 
broader policy scenario as indicated in chapter 0 (overall EC involvement), chapter 0 
(general regulatory principles) and chapter 0 (assessing risks associated with self or co-
regulatory organisation (XRO) involvement). 
The next step is to determine whether XROs are already active in the policy area, and 
their characteristics according to the general schema laid out in Chapter 3 (especially 
Table 4). If there are active XROs, they provide the IA starting point for the ‘do nothing’ 
and ‘formal regulation’ options, as well as any XRO alternatives to regulation. Whether 
or not such arrangements currently exist, it is useful also to consider whether XRO 
alternatives are likely to provide relevant and credible alternatives, which should be 
done using the advantages, disadvantages and risks cited in chapter 0 and the 
framework conditions listed in chapter 0.  
The next step (whether considering XROs as part of the context for ‘do nothing’ and 
‘formal regulation’ options or as alternatives in their own right) is to develop a credible 
specification. While the evidence base shows that fine details of XRO constitution, 
context and behaviour can have large impacts. It is neither necessary nor desirable to 
specify them in detail at this stage; such details are likely to be determined in the course 
of implementation and cannot be foreseen. However, active consultation and 
comparison with existing XROs (e.g. using the full case studies produced by this project 
and other cited sources) can be useful in deciding what should be specified. The 
objective is to produce a credible ex ante assessment of a viable alternative, rather than 
to detail exhaustively and predict the effects associated with a particular XRO – in most 
cases, such prediction is neither possible nor appropriate. Note, too, that the ex ante 
assessment of XROs is likely to be less definitive than that of formal regulation, but this 
inherent uncertainty is a consequence of self-regulation itself, and not necessarily a 
drawback to IA as a central part of a deliberative policy formulation process. For this 
Establish policy stance regarding 
XROs (0) and evaluation (0, 0) 
Are there existing XROs or are 
alternative arrangements viable 
(0)? 
‘Normal IA’ 
Specify options (0 and 
examples from Chapter 
Lay out implementation, 
impact logics (Chapter 2) 
Develop logical framework (criteria, 
indicators, analytic methods, 
assumptions (Table 2, IA guidance, 
etc.) 
Map specific issues to logical 
framework and develop assessment 
plan (Table 3) 
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purpose, the ‘canonical’ options and policy scenarios described in chapter 0 provide a 
useful starting point. 
Associated with each option are a range of channels through which it is likely to affect 
policy objectives and a range of costs and benefits are developed and distributed. These 
can be identified on the basis of the analytic material, and used to develop the relevant 
intervention logics (process and logic maps). These can be used then to identify the key 
elements of the logical framework for each option being assessed, in particular the key 
stages, associated criteria, relevant data sources and methods for constructing and 
evaluating the indicators associated with each criterion and, critically for XROs, the key 
assumptions that must hold in order for the logic to work as anticipated. This latter step 
draws in particular on case study material (where relevant XROs exist) on the risks 
identified and on the principles of risk assessment (these are described in many places, 
and specific issues raised in chapter 0). The risk/assumption analysis plays three 
significant roles:  
 it provides an indication of the robustness of the IA;  
 it identifies key stakeholders whose participation in the XRO may be especially 
important; and 
 it highlights the scope for scenario analysis to explore the consequences, if the 
assumptions are not met. 
The final preparatory stages are to check the completeness of the framework using the 
more comprehensive list of issues provided and, with their aid, to develop specific 
evaluation questions. 
 Scenarios of European Commission Action/Inaction 
The overall stance regarding XROs deriving from the challenges of the Lisbon Agenda 
and the state of progress towards the Better Regulation and IA Agendas can be 
anticipated through a form of scenario analysis tracing the likely path of evolution. The 
point here is that, just as XROs are linked across participants and issues, XRO 
initiatives also help to shape understanding and use of such alternatives in the future. 
These scenarios have three main dimensions.  
The first dimension consists of paradigmatic and systemic attitudes to regulation per se: 
the degree to which government intervention is needed and desirable and the 
willingness of citizens and business to shoulder the resulting costs, cooperate with 
regulatory initiatives, etc. The values underlying these attitudes are concerned with such 
issues as: big vs. small government; the governance and ethical implications of 
outsourcing regulatory services; and the desirability on general as well as instrumental 
grounds of ‘big tent’ consultation or co-opting of a wide range of concerned parties. 
The second dimension describes the options and developments specifically concerned 
with the EC level of action and the role of EC institutions. It takes into account such 
matters as: the scope for EC action; the relevance and strength of the drivers of EC 
engagement listed in chapter 0; the specificities of European Regulations as opposed to 
Directives in relation to XROs; and the possibilities for coordinated action via the 
Interagency Agreement, Member State multilateral coordination and international 
platforms. 
The third dimension considers the internal ‘coordinated regulation’ of European 
institutions. The settings in which XROs are active often include those where a pre-
existing governance gap has arisen as a result of issues that cross ministerial or 
Directorate-General (DG) boundaries, or where coordination within government or 
between government and outside parties is perceived as weak. Therefore, it is 
  
 29
appropriate to consider a fourth agenda: that of ‘joined-up government’. Such 
coordination is needed not only among DGs, but also across the instruments at their 
disposal. This is recognised in the i2010 Policy Framework, which provides a 
coordinating platform for furthering the Lisbon Agenda objectives via combined 
regulation, taxation, standardisation, public procurement, etc. These are all in a general 
sense ‘regulation by other means’, but they differ in terms of evaluation methods, 
objectives, etc. Therefore, the specification and assessment of XROs must take 
developments in this arena into account. 
This increasing role for cross-cutting policy coordination is mirrored in the Better 
Regulation Agenda. Thus it is increasingly necessary to take other types of policy and 
other policy entities into account when performing IA. This requirement could be met 
in a variety of ways. These include: a ‘parallel’ approach in which separate offices 
maintain ‘mirror’ models of each others’ (including XROs’) behaviour; or the 
development of a single coherent or converged posture (with common data, contractual 
forms, etc.) at the DG or even EC level. Less favourable alternatives could include the 
prescription of a least-common-denominator common assessment model or a 
fragmentation movement away from the integrated IA model. These considerations 
determine both the scope of the proposed IA and the degree to which it should be 
coordinated or specified externally. 
 General Criteria for Choosing Options 
A variety of general criteria can be used to classify existing arrangements and to 
establish conditions for XRO alternatives. In either case, they can be used as evaluative 
criteria or to define conditions under which the XRO will be allowed to operate 
autonomously. Chief among these are the following: 
 tractability of the XRO from a policy perspective, in particular the extent to 
which its (or its members’) powers and interests are aligned with public interest; 
 constitutional framework and actual behaviour in relation to the organisation’s 
legitimacy, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability. While an XRO is not 
held to the same standards as a government agency, nonetheless as a recipient of 
delegated power it must act in a manner consistent with those standards; 
 efficacy in meeting the regulatory need or filling the governance gap, as 
determined by the issues that it addresses, the clarity of its operations and their 
consistency with existing policy stances and, critically, the levels and types of 
compliance that it is able to deliver; 
 in keeping with the Better Regulation Agenda, XROs are expected to offer 
particular advantages in terms of flexibility and adaptability in response to 
sectoral and public interest developments perceived by the participants and to 
changes in official policy; 
 the extent to which the XRO is, or is likely to be, ‘joined-up’ across sectoral and 
interest domains externally; whether the likely operation of the XRO will cross 
governmental policy boundaries or lines of accountability; and whether such 
crossings are appropriate; and 
 since almost all XROs include powerful industry players and directly or 
indirectly affect market conduct (and even market structure and economic 
performance), it is necessary to anticipate competitive and other spillover and 
rebound effects. 
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 Risk and Regulation 
The importance of risk assessment is well understood. In relation to IA, it is as 
important to get a sense of the range of possible impacts as it is to generate a ‘central’ 
estimate of likely impacts. This can inform the design of compensatory or hedging 
strategies, coordination with other forms of policy activity and the assignment of 
liability and responsibility. These considerations arise in general with IA, but are 
particularly germane to the Better Regulation Agenda37 and XROs, where government 
control is weaker. 
In this respect, it is useful to mention two broad classes of risk assessment. The first is 
concerned with how XROs are likely to respond to risks and uncertainty and the degree 
to which this differs from the way formal regulation handles risk. While the general 
answer is clearly that XROs do better in some respects and worse in others, the balance 
will vary with the particular impact assessment context. The second concerns risks that 
are created by policies that accept, sanction, constrain or inhibit XROs.  
The areas considered in this study combine complex high-technology social problems 
with regulation in the public interest. This creates risks around:  
 sustainability – the possibility that the regulation may outlive its purpose, or 
that the development and continuation of progress may be imperilled by XRO 
activities; 
 efficiency – the possibility that market distortions may arise, or that the transfer 
of costs from public to private parties may lead to increased overall burdens, 
even while the burden on public institutions diminishes; and 
 participation – the possibility that key players will opt out or be excluded, or the 
inverse risk that wide participation will result in a loss of focus, institutional 
‘bloat’, slowing down, etc. 
Further, it should be noted that sectoral differences extend to risks as well as benefits. 
These differences should be taken into account for both policy formulation and ex ante 
assessment.  
For instance, recent failures of accountability, transparency and risk management in the 
financial sector derive in part from the failure of key assumptions, e.g. that risk-
spreading provided diversification and thus minimised the extent or damage due to 
uncertainty. They also highlight the problem of complexity when the mechanisms 
through which effects are produced become so intricate that they cannot be managed 
effectively, or the patterns of risk measured and understood. Undoubtedly, another 
factor has been the ability of key parties to by-pass self-regulatory constraints by 
delisting (going into private equity control) or ‘going dark’ (retreating from listed 
exchanges to the over-the-counter equity market). The key finding for XROs is not that 
it is possible to evade their control, but that significant volumes of business did so quite 
suddenly, creating a situation from which it is difficult to return either to effective self-
regulation, or even to effective formal regulation. Thus, the risks may have long-term as 
well as short-term consequences. Finally, even strong action in relation to failures of 
accountability (such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200238) may have perverse 
consequences, as some businesses suffer extra compliance burdens while others flee the 
jurisdiction. 
                                               
37 Recently, the UK government has replaced the Better Regulation Commission (formerly the Better Regulation Task 
Force) with the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council. See the report “Public Risk – the Next Frontier for Better 
Regulation”, at: 
http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/upload/assets/www.brc.gov.uk/public_risk_report_070108.pdf. 
38 The full text may be found at: http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf. 
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In high-technology, high-risk areas such as nuclear power and biotechnology, rapid 
change and complex potential risks cast doubt on both the power of innovation to 
produce sustainable progress and the acceptance by the public of XROs as efficacious 
and effective mechanisms for managing technological or implementation risk. Here, the 
fundamental issue is one of alignment – whether industry, consumer and broader 
public interests, understanding and risk tolerance coincide. Indeed, in some cases (e.g. 
genetically-modified foods) there has been a perceived failure of self-regulation of 
trade-borne risks, due not only to the misalignment of commercial and other interests, 
but also to the different weights attached to these interests and objectives by sovereign 
governments. 
In other cases (notably stem cell research, assisted reproduction, etc.) regulation is 
complicated by the sheer range and difference in objectives spanning religious and 
ethical concerns, strong economic interests and ‘hot’ issues relating to child safety, for 
example. 
In some sectors, these challenges have called forth other approaches outside the frame 
of XROs as considered here, including citizen juries, discourse-orientated civil society 
involvement, charitable foundations and innovation partnerships, to obviate the need 
for regulation. There are also a range of other specific structures for ‘responsibility 
sharing’ such as non-ministerial departments (executive or advisory), non-
departmental public bodies, quasi-non-governmental organisations, public 
corporations (including chartered bodies), etc.  
Note that while these possibilities are associated with a range of sectors far beyond the 
Internet, the fundamental challenges they pose have arisen already in relation to the 
areas covered in the case studies, albeit with different pace, historical context and 
intensity; thus they remain relevant reference points. 
The framework developed here may need to be extended to a much wider variety of 
risks and institutional arrangements for managing risk. The fundamental principles of 
risk management in relation to IA are as follows. 
 Are all relevant risks identified? 
 Are they properly assessed as to the likelihood and severity of, and amenability 
to, control? 
 Do institutional arrangements strike an appropriate balance between placing 
risk on those best able to bear it and those best able to address it (reduce its 
likelihood or severity)? 
This should guide risk assessment in relation to XRO IA. To the extent that risks are 
best managed collectively, the question of whether new regulatory innovations can 
prevent ‘free-riding’ by engaging all stakeholders is as germane to risk assessment as it 
is to accountability and compliance analysis.  
 Framework Conditions Favouring or Hindering Self- and Co-
regulation 
Table 1 is a synthesis of good practice guidelines and policy analyses of existing schemes 
and identifies general characteristics that make self- or co-regulation alternatives 
particularly relevant.  
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Table 1: Framework conditions 
Premature 
decision 
A specific self- or co-regulation option – perhaps an incumbent regime – may seem an obvious 
candidate alternative to, or comparator for, formal regulation. However, especially in situations 
characterised by rapid change, superior (and differentiated) stakeholder information or many 
kinds of stakeholders, wide consultation may be necessary when choosing options or relevant 
mechanisms, costs and benefits. This increases the chances of finding a superior alternative, 
producing a credible IA and avoiding capture by an incumbent XRO with its attendant risk of 
adverse competition effects. 
Market 
conditions 
Fragmented markets (e.g. numerous different enterprises, in complex supply chains) – self-
regulation may be especially appropriate where the primary objective is to exert a degree of 
control over fragmented markets, because XROs can match the pattern of fragmentation via 
participation. 
Low-concentration markets with many small operators create challenges for traditional 
enforcement authorities. There may be too many to cover effectively. Self- or co-regulatory 
arrangements can encourage industry or professional insiders to enforce the rules, leading to 
greater enforcement than direct state regulation. 
Self- and co-regulation suit ‘thin’ markets with only participants on at least one side, as it is 
easier to reach a consensus on requirements and monitor compliance. Indeed, many smaller 
markets already provide some self-policing. However, care must be taken to involve all 
interested parties to avoid cartelisation. Also, it is easier to monitor compliance when the 
majority of goods or services arise within the EU or key operators have a strong European base. 
In markets with extended supply chains, the necessary expertise and practical ability to ensure 
that XRO rules and resulting compliance further social objectives may be distributed among a 
number of different stakeholders. This is particularly true for market regulation, where active 
involvement of producers is essential. 
Stakeholder 
diversity 
Self-regulation may be more effective for involving a wide range of stakeholders with differing 
power and interests. 
The more stakeholders support the use of self- and co-regulation, the greater the chance of 
success. If sector players oppose the requirements, problems can occur. If they need to be 
coerced, prescriptive legislation may be preferred, given adequate enforcement. 
Consumer interest and pressure can be key factors supporting or ruling out self- and co-
regulation. Increasing the range and quality of information available can influence consumers’ 
buying behaviour, leading to voluntary action without classic regulation39. 
Where a broad range of stakeholders hold divergent interests, the state may be unable to fulfil 
its traditional objective role – where interests overlap and conflict, it may be hard for the state 
to intervene to balance polarised positions. In such cases, the state and the public have 
collective interests in addition to (potentially conflicting) interest in specific cases.  
This is complicated further in cases where the state is responsible (as employer or contractor) 
for providing public services and thus cannot balance the interests of providers and recipient. 
Here, self- or (more likely) co-regulatory measures will be better placed to draw in those with 
different interests in order to find workable solutions. Often, arrangements which involve such 
groups in standards setting, rule-making and enforcement will be more effective than direct 
state regulation, which can be remote and blunt in its application. 
Rapidly-changing 
environments 
Self-regulation is suited to fast-changing environments that may be hindered by static systems 
of state regulation. Regulations that cannot keep pace with developments will be ineffective – 
they may have unintended and perverse effects, become irrelevant and thus ignored by those 
they were intended to regulate, or may simply be ill-equipped to sustain delivery of their 
original objectives in a changed environment. This same criticism may apply to some statutory 
XROs. Although adaptability is a commonly-accepted principle of good regulation, those subject 
to regulation must retain some freedom to decide how to achieve these goals, and self- and co-
regulation may be more responsive to changing needs. Also, they may be easier to change than 
statute-based regulations.  
However, the credibility of policy also depends on the power of commitment. In cases where the 
objective is to encourage those closest to the issue to monitor the situation and take appropriate 
action, too much flexibility can undermine credibility and lead to confusion or loss of ‘purchase’. 
Risk In cases of serious risk to health and safety, etc. classic regulation usually provides legal 
certainty and clear means of legal redress. However, intervention must be proportionate to the 
risk and regulation and carefully targeted. Self-regulation can usefully complement formal 
rules, and is widespread even in areas such as medicine, where the risks are considerable. 
                                               
39 See e.g. Bartle and Vass (2007). 
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Expertise Self-regulation may be especially appropriate for complex or technical policy areas. Better 
results (clearer, more appropriate and more enforceable rules) are achieved when requirements 
are set, at least in part, by experts with greater market or technical understanding. This may 
need to be done in partnership with other stakeholders in order to ensure that the resulting 
rules identify the best means of achieving policy objectives. Research suggests that experts 
usually play more active roles in helping to develop alternatives than in crafting prescriptive 
legislation. 
Where competent service delivery itself demands a high level of expertise, the state may not 
have the knowledge needed to regulate effectively – hence the prevalence of self-regulation for 
skilled professions. Further, experts outside both government and the self- or co-regulated 
activity or profession may be effective monitors. The development of alternatives or the 
evaluation of existing XROs should consider how existing expertise is, or can be, harnessed. If 
such expertise is sidelined, regulation may be effectively blocked or inappropriate from the 
start. 
Where necessary expertise is spread across a range of different groups, innovative self- and co-
regulation approaches may be required to secure their active and public interest-orientated 
engagement. 
Monitoring Robust and transparent monitoring is vital. Objectives and deadlines must be well defined and 
realistic and careful monitoring of progress against such objectives is needed to build 
confidence and trust in the use of self- and co-regulation. Thus, the feasibility of such 
monitoring – by the XRO, government and the public – is an important consideration. 
Incentives Self- and co-regulation will be more successful if stakeholders are encouraged to support it and 
feel that compliance is worthwhile. Sometimes, the threat of EU legislation can be enough; 
more positively, engagement can be enhanced by the promise of good publicity and sales 
generated if participants act on their own initiative to tackle problems, rather than waiting for 
outside intervention.  
Sanctions Where non-compliance may cause serious harm and full compliance is critical, criminal 
sanctions may be needed to deter breaches. They can be provided only by legislation, which may 
rule out self- or co-regulation except in conjunction with legislative tools. Less serious breaches 
can be deterred or punished by measures (e.g. expulsion from trade bodies, fines and/or 
negative publicity) which do not need legal underpinning. 
Representative 
bodies 
It is easier to negotiate and monitor self- and co-regulation if there is a strong trade association 
in place; also, such a group can help to police the market, freeing up resources. At the same 
time, independence of the XRO may be essential for a range of policy reasons. 
 General Principles of Regulation 
The following principles, adapted from those contained in the European Commission’s 
2002 Action Plan on Better Regulation, are provided as a starting suggestion (Table 2). 
The relevance and specifics of these principles will vary in different cases, and greater 
specificity on such issues as market distortion and burden reduction may be needed. 
Table 2: Good self-regulation principles 
Transparency Clear, well-defined and accessible: 
 rules that identify intended outcomes; 
 guidance for those applying the rules; 
 internal channels of communication; 
 guidance for external stakeholders (e.g. consumers) about what the scheme does and does not 
cover; 
 annual reports, etc. detailing financial performance, complaints (number, handling, outcomes), 
etc.; 
 independent dispute resolution procedures; and 
 delineation of roles within the organisation (e.g. a separate disciplinary committee). 
Accountability  appropriate and properly used channels for consulting members; 
 well-publicised, quick and simple procedures for dealing with public complaints; 
 well-publicised, fair and efficient appeals procedures for members and external stakeholders; 
 access to independent arbitration or an ombudsman; 
 transparent processes for appointing and removing governing bodies; 
 lay representation on decision-making bodies to balance expertise and challenge complacency; 
 clear division between XRO and bodies solely representing industry’s interests; and 
 mechanisms for reporting on activities to the wider public. 
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Targeting  clearly defined goals and objectives; 
 performance indicators to measure effectiveness; 
 clear priorities, e.g. greatest risk of harm to consumers; 
 extensive internal and external consultation on rules, codes of practice, etc.; and 
 regular reviews to assess whether rules and other XRO functions remain necessary and 
effective. 
Proportionality  meaningful sanction mechanisms that do not disadvantage those trying to comply; 
 procedures in place to allow government monitoring; and 
 procedures to guard good practice against risk of disproportionate sanctions for minor offences. 
Consistency  rules that dovetail with other relevant rules and regulations; and 
 procedures to ensure that similar problems are resolved in similar ways. 
European XRO Options 
To provide a concrete starting point for considering future possibilities, in addition to 
the obvious option of strengthened European levels of regulation, we identify three XRO 
options suggested by our analysis that always should be considered for inclusion in IA at 
EC level, corresponding approximately to: ‘laissez-faire’, self-regulation and co-
regulation. However, because the case studies and other evidence clearly demonstrate 
the importance of details of organisation and implementation, we also describe within 
these options some aspects of the general context (Better Regulation scenario) within 
which the options can be pursued and to which they will contribute, and consider the 
level of government at which they should be pursued. These three elements (general 
options, scenario contexts and levels of implementation) are described in this chapter. 
The options relate to the ‘Beaufort Scale’ developed in Chapter 3, which unpacks the 
types of XRO that we discovered in examining the case studies. While the 12 ideal types 
of XRO identified may suggest a microscopic granular approach to classification of 
XROs, we consider this to be very much a work-in-progress to be tested against real 
XROs and IAs with a level of detail that will need to be tested in individual IAs. 
Options to Consider in European Union Ex Ante Impact Assessments 
1. Option Zero:  
the ‘do nothing’ or ‘laissez-faire’ option always should be included in regulatory 
IA. Within the context of this study, usually it will amount to tolerance of 
existing XRO arrangements, but as these XROs are dynamic, it is not a stable 
option. The ‘trend extrapolation’ scenario probably will bring gradual increases 
in current self-regulation with developing islands of co-regulation (already seen 
in some countries, e.g. Germany, and sectors, e.g. child pornography). 
2. New self-regulation 
a more proactive approach is to encourage the establishment or further 
development of independent self-regulatory arrangements. This can include 
engagement with various XRO functions, including membership/participation, 
organisation and procedures, rule-making, monitoring, enforcement, sanctions 
and evaluation. Support can take the form of (conditional) delegation of powers, 
financial resources, recognition of the XRO in policy formation or 
implementation bodies, or recognition of XRO decisions (e.g. by endorsing 
XRO-generated standards for public procurement, accepting standards 
compliance as evidence of associated regulatory compliance, allowing evidence 
of (non-) compliance to be used in court proceedings, etc.), and taking part in 
policy and/or implementation fora, as with Pan-European Game Information 
(PEGI) Online. 
3. New co-regulation 
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the greatest degree of engagement with XROs comes via co-regulation. This can 
take a variety of forms. One is a formal and explicit division of powers along 
policy area or domain lines, or a separate allocation of roles, e.g. decision-
making, monitoring, reporting, and/or enforcement. An example of the latter 
form of differentiated roles is where either the public or the co-regulatory body 
takes explicit responsibility for enforcing the rules or decisions of the other, 
based on sovereign power (state enforcement) or informational advantage (XRO 
enforcement). Such arrangements are ‘fixed’ in the sense that responsibilities 
are allocated at the outset. A more flexible and adaptive arrangement is to base 
co-regulation on an undertaking to support (in one of the ways identified above) 
proposals arising from XROs under certain positive conditions40. Conversely, it 
is possible to combine the development of XROs to address existing or emerging 
problems with control of other risks by the use of negative conditions, under 
which proposals or activities would be actively restricted, supplanted or pre-
empted. Such conditions could be derived from competition policy, single 
market or other treaty obligations, the general regulatory principles described in 
2 etc. When flexible co-regulation is implemented by either positive or negative 
conditions, IA should attempt to gauge whether – and to what extent – the 
conditions are likely to be met. In addition, it is necessary to assess the legal and 
policy scope and implications of government activity to support or restrict 
XROs. 
Policy Scenario Context 
Because engagement with XROs represents a departure from regulatory ‘business as 
usual’, the implications of any particular option go beyond the specific policy area or 
organisation. Thus it is appropriate to place IA in a more general scenario, describing 
the evolution of attitudes towards such a ‘privatisation of regulation’. This chapter 
briefly describes four possible scenarios. These need not describe developments exactly 
or exclusively – the actual evolution of the Better Regulation, IA and Lisbon Agendas 
will show elements of each. They are included here as an aid to scenario development 
rather than as complete scenarios, and should be used both to test assumptions (in 
which capacity they apply to all options whose impacts are assessed) and to draw out 
likely contributions of XROs to overall governance. 
Continued status quo with increased user-generated regulation or ‘self-
organisation’ 
The ‘direction of travel’ in XROs towards more co-regulation may be 
counteracted by user-generated deregulation or ‘self-organisation’, in which the 
ability to report abuse or switch between applications and services (e.g. social 
networking sites, virtual worlds) is heightened by new technologies and 
applications. Governments can take more a monitoring or background view on 
the new developments while maintaining current regimes. In this scenario, the 
ability of users and other affected parties to take over from or increase the 
efficacy of existing (formal, self- or co-)regulation is enhanced by new 
technologies and applications that increase users’ ability to report abuse, or 
switch between applications and services (e.g. social networking sites, virtual 
worlds). Governments can adopt a ‘watching brief’, monitoring new 
developments while maintaining or even ‘ramping down’. 
Regulation 2.0 
                                               
40 This has been followed by the Dutch government in relation to e.g. construction and environmental standards. 
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This represents an across-the-board movement towards formally recognised 
self- and co-regulation, backed by audits to ensure that XROs adequately 
enforce rules, reform their activities and represent the interests of all 
stakeholders. For example, movements towards this can be seen in a social 
networking ‘Bill of Rights’. It would involve delegation of powers to XROs, with 
financial and/or administrative support, as well as supporting XRO membership 
(e.g. by endorsing XRO-generated standards for public procurement or 
accepting standards compliance as evidence of associated regulatory 
compliance). It would be likely to involve inclusion of government officials in 
policy and/or implementation fora, as with PEGI Online. 
Legislation 2.0 
Mves towards preventing harm may take a more co-regulatory or even formal 
regulatory pattern. This scenario represents a different policy decision than 
Regulation 2.0, with more formal, statute-based approaches to managing or 
preventing harm. 
Without EU harmonisation, there could be potentially diverging national outcomes in 
such areas as Internet video, suicide sites, social networking, copyright, privacy, 
personal Internet security, etc. Note here the role of the e-Commerce Directive, 
constraining national differences by the common EC legal basis in liability of content 
providers (hosts not Internet Service Providers; ISPs), This might involve: 
 explicit division of powers between the XRO and government in some domains, 
or separation of decision-making, monitoring, reporting, enforcement); 
 implicit enforcement support; 
 affirmative (Dutch) criteria for supporting exogenous or autonomously arising 
XRO proposals (with resources, information, regulatory forbearance, delegated 
or agency enforcement power); 
 negative criteria for restricting, supplanting or pre-empting XROs (e.g. on 
competition policy, single market or other grounds). One key issue is the ability 
of government to restrict XROs. 
Implementation Levels 
These options can be implemented in various ways. Where suitably representative, 
effective and informed XROs exist, new powers can be added to their existing portfolio 
of activities, with the support or encouragement of the government entity (or entities) 
best placed to engage them (as in extending the roles of hotlines or classification 
schemes). This will often be the EU as a whole, where the XROs or their key members 
have a strong European base or where self- or co-regulation can be ‘decentralised’ from 
the global to the European level. In other cases, where the necessary engagement, 
powers and information are divided among existing XROs – and where the policy issue 
would be better served by their cooperation than by their competition – government 
can encourage or facilitate their merger, as with the Netherlands Institute for the 
Classification of Audiovisual Media (NICAM) or the Kommission für 
Jugendmedienschutz (KJM). Where a full merger of XROs or their powers is not 
desirable (e.g. on competition grounds), the appropriate governmental entity can create 
a suitable framework contract for stakeholders to encourage best practice41, to combine 
organisational and legal certainty with flexibility.  
However, there may be circumstances where XRO options should not be implemented 
at European level, even where the issues are of specifically pan-European concern. In 
                                               
41 As with the 1997 and 2006 Recommendations (to content hosts) on the protection of minors and human dignity. 
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situations where EC competence is limited by treaty or practical considerations, it may 
be more appropriate to push implementation downstream to the Member State or 
regional level, where implementation can be designed closer to the market, as with the 
European Framework Agreement on mobile content. In other cases, problems may not 
be tractable except at the global level, in which case it is appropriate to transfer 
implementation to global institutions – either through intergovernmental negotiations 
or through partnership with and/or support for global XROs, as for instance by the 
London Action Plan (LAP), or Internet Governance Forum (IGF; a perhaps heroic 
assumption). This may be more effective in the case of pressing international issues 
such as Internet security rather than culturally divergent issues dealing with content 
regulation. 
Issues Arising in Relation to XRO Impact Assessment 
The following issues are derived from the policy analysis literature, policy documents 
and case studies. Not all issues will be relevant in all cases, but many of them will need 
to be tackled in most assessments. They have been cross-referenced by topic and 
citations provided: 
 option choice – issues affecting the choice of an arrangement to assess; 
 relevance, design – issues affecting the further specification of an alternative, or 
the assessment of an existing arrangement in terms of its suitability for pursuit 
of public objectives; 
 efficiency – issues affecting the cost and cost-effectiveness of a scheme and (to 
the extent that it influences outputs) participation; 
 effectiveness – issues affecting compliance and the ability of the scheme to 
address the underlying societal problem (also affected by participation); 
 impact – issues bearing on the wider effects of the arrangement, such as the 
impact on market competitiveness, the ability to track changes in the sector or 
situation, etc.; 
 sustainability – issues affecting the ability of the scheme to deliver good 
governance and progress towards overarching policy objectives over a sustained 
period, when structural shifts and responses to self- or co-regulation are taken 
into account; 
 risk assessment – issues connected with the realisation and assessment of risks 
arising from the arrangement, or risks affecting its ability to deliver public 
service objectives; and 
 IA – issues concerned with the practice of IA in this area. 
To apply the table, these issues can be grouped further in relation to the sector and 
specific policy issues involved. However, this grouping is context-dependent. Some 
sectors have extensive existing self-regulatory structures; in other cases, the issues 
involved show a separation of the interests of the various parties42. 
                                               
42 For instance, discussion of recent French and British proposals to make ISPs liable for enforcing property rights has 
centred on whether ISPs are required to incur costs protecting the economic interests of content-owners, and thus 
whether rights-owners should participate in the self-regulation, and/or ISPs can recoup costs by ‘non-net-neutral’ 
charges to content providers. In this setting, issues of participation and the surrounding economic (and regulatory) 
context take priority. On the other hand, in relation to harmful content, the cross-subsidisation issue does not arise: 
while enforcement is undoubtedly costly for ISPs, no other identifiable commercial group directly benefits from the 
activity. 
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Table 3: Issues arising in relation to self- and co-regulatory impact assessment 
Issue 
O
p
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R
elevan
ce, d
esign
 
E
fficien
cy 
E
ffectiven
ess 
Im
p
act 
Su
stain
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R
isk assessm
en
t 
IA
 
R
eferen
ce 
Coordination within XRO/policy network   X      [66] 
Effectiveness limited by bypass   X      [15], [35] 
A diversity of approaches to service delivery poses challenge for 
efficient regulation   X      [84] 
Financial basis, corporate form (impact on level of activity, 
targeting)   X X     [78] 
Simplicity of goals, specificity of means   X X     [52] 
Full range of costs, distributional impacts, administrative 
requirements (not just costs)   X  X    [67] 
Flow, quality and management of information   X  X X   [52] 
Credibility of standards enhanced by expertise    X     [50] 
Credibility of standards enhanced by public/private enforcement    X     [50] 
Transparency of framework (impact on businesses lacking 
regulatory certainty)    X     [8] 
Do business activities cross jurisdictions?    X     [8] 
Are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) affected (access to 
regulatory expertise, voice in XRO, regulatory uncertainty)    X     [8] 
Impact of others’ compliance on stakeholders     X     [1] 
Compliance cost    X     [1] 
Public access to XRO (compliance) information    X X    [51], [25] 
Credibility of rules, actions, public information    X X    [43] 
Scope for regulatory innovation by XRO    X X    [52] 
Risk of capture of/by XRO    X X    [15], [59] 
Discretion allowed to members (functional standards, ‘or-
equivalent’ compliance, etc.)    X X    [52] 
Scope for ‘earned autonomy’    X X X   [52] 
Sustainability risk of ‘free-riding’ and opportunism (ease of 
entry/exit) – examine participation    X  X   [54] 
Reputation payoffs to the XRO as a whole compared to those for 
individual members?    X  X   [72] 
Integrated IA vs. specific types (business burdens, competition 
effects); risk to coherence, quality, consistency in Better Regulation 
Agenda 
       X [48], [75], [1] 
Ongoing audit of IAs        X [28] 
RIA advisory role of EC        X [28] 
Credibility of data (used as bargaining chip?)        X [28] 
Include wide range of relevant alternatives        X [87] 
Active consultation during IA preparation to identify alternatives, 
sources of evidence, etc.        X [87] 
Extend quantitative techniques as far as possible using ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ data, multiple sources, econometric analysis, etc.        X 
[87], 
[48] 
Centralisation or decentralisation of RIAs        X [46] 
Use case studies to build understanding, balance internal and 
external validity; guidelines for use        X [56] 
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What is the logic of the process for rule-making? (stages: agenda-
setting, problem identification, decision, implementation and 
evaluation) 
       X [80] 
Use Standard Cost Methodology to assess administrative burdens   X     X [28], [6] 
Impact on timing and extent of future developments (e.g. tech 
solutions)      X X   [51] 
‘Culture’ of XRO players (business, consumer, high-tech): 
egalitarian vs. efficiency objectives; alignment of XRO and public 
objectives 
    X X   [26], [19] 
Competition assessment guidelines     X X   [75] 
Certification delay, innovation, adoption impacts     X X   [85] 
Voluntary agreements X        [51], [59] 
How large are monitoring costs? (affects incentive to form as well 
as operation) X  X      [37] 
How many actual/potential members are there? X  X      [37], [7], [17] 
Unbundling of XRO participation, rule-making, monitoring, 
enforcement, evaluation, etc. X X       [69] 
Better Regulation principles X X       [7] 
Relevant (actual or potential) vertical regulation (at other layers)? X X       [16] 
Conditions for XROs (checklists) X        
[9], [67], 
[68], 
[82], 
[11], [7] 
Screen: market fragmentation (difference in literature as to 
pro/con) X        
[9], [25], 
[17] 
Screen: fast-moving environment (flexibility as effectiveness, 
impact, sustainability criterion) X   X X X   
[25], [7], 
[17] 
Involvement, need for specific expertise X    X X   
[25], 
[50], [7], 
[17] 
Screen: wide range of stakeholders X X       [25], [7], [17] 
Establish geographic reach of issue, map existing policy network 
and stakeholders  X       [66] 
Tension between decentralisation and broad participation  X       [15] 
Compared to Directives, global standards more compatible with 
regulatory autonomy  X       [50] 
Independent advisory/research capability?  X       [69] 
Wide consumer participation  X X X X    [44] 
Use form of existing XRO as indicator of future objectives, 
performance, impacts  X X X X    [52] 
Need for transnational agreement: are the XROs already 
transnational in scope?  X X X X    [76] 
Bargaining within XRO, with government  X  X     
[51], 
[39], 
[69], 
[70] 
Placement of liability for outcomes within XRO  X  X     [32] 
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Are there strong informational asymmetries between XRO 
members and regulators?  X  X     
[37], [7], 
[17] 
Relationship between XRO and concerned authorities (partnership, 
adversarial, etc.)  X  X  X   [19] 
Subsidiarity: applicability across Member State regulatory 
environments, impact on regulatory autonomy  X   X    [19], [45] 
Is the XRO intended to pre-empt, weaken or subvert government 
regulation?  X   X    [70] 
Democratic accountability of standards bodies  X   X    [50] 
Coverage, governance of multiple XROs X X X  X    [69] 
Use ‘sunset clauses’ to protect flexibility, minimise capture, etc. 
(e.g. with statutory XRO)  X    X   [34] 
Likely future evolution of rules, arrangements  X    X   [52] 
Use scenarios to test assumptions (due to plasticity of situation); 
past history shows trends       X  
[33], 
[58] 
Political interest (interference) in outcome       X  [84] 
Include policy and delivery risk in screening XRO options 
(inconsistency in literature whether risk argues for or against); 
examine likelihood, incidence, voice of affected parties, power to 
change 
      X  
[25], 
[11], [7], 
[17] 
Consider sustainability of XRO in terms of voluntary association, 
agenda creep      X   [66], [10] 
Creative destruction (‘sunsets’, withdrawal, risk of 
institutionalisation)      X   [52] 
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Chapter 4 Conclusions and recommendations 
Public policy and the peer-reviewed literature converge on the recognition that there is 
always a price to be paid for regulation in the form of distortion, cost, 
institutionalisation, agenda creep and so on. This needs to be offset against the 
justifying benefit, which may mean extending or shrinking regulation in various areas, 
rebalancing rule-making and rule-enforcing, delegating or clawing back responsibility, 
etc. It is necessary to reassess not only how to regulate, but also whether and even why 
(if some needs become more pressing or cease to be relevant). Generally, this calls for 
some evolved form of, or alternative to, regulation. The paper presents six specific 
findings and associated recommendations for policy formulation. 
There is no ‘magic bullet’ in Internet regulation; resolving contested policy claims 
among competitiveness, innovation, public safety and security concerns involves 
continual political judgment. However, Impact Assessment provides a tool for clarifying 
potential costs and benefits even where political judgment necessitates a decision that 
may impair competitiveness and/or innovation. This may help in the design of 
regulatory policies to mitigate e.g. the anti-competitive effects of an otherwise necessary 
increase in regulation. We by no means discount the need for more regulation in policy 
areas where the benefits of market-based XROs may be outweighed by distortions of 
competition, free rider problems, lack of compliance incentives, extra costs in self-
regulation or other drawback. We do conclude that, given suitable options for 
assessment and a full understanding of the conditions that lead to XRO success, the 
Impact Assessment methodology may be expected to yield satisfactory results when 
applied to XROs in the Internet domain. It should therefore be employed more broadly. 
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Appendix: Case Study Results: Describing Existing XROs 
This short summary and analysis concisely explains the outcomes from the most intensive part 
of this project, the examination of 21 self- or co-regulatory organisation (XRO) case studies. It is 
structured as follows: first, it explains the contextual classification of the selected XROs; second, 
it examines the financing and budgets for XROs which are very different to their co- or 
regulatory equivalents; third, the dynamics of XRO development as observed in the empirical 
phase of the project, including the managing structures of each XRO as measured against 
independence of directors and stakeholder representation; and finally, a gap analysis examines 
the substantive and emerging features of the Internet environment. These are grouped into six 
areas: 
 taxonomic gaps, including the pressing need to ‘unpack’ self-regulation and consider 
more minutely the types of XRO that exist; 
 gaps regarding innovation and competitiveness; 
 policy gaps including privacy, intellectual property and the increased use of filtering by 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs); 
 institutional gaps, including the use of soft law and alternative policy instruments; 
 enforcement and compliance gaps; and 
 methodological gaps, including the need for broader stakeholder surveys.  
Finally, we contextualise these findings within their implications for Impact Assessment (IA). 
This leads in the following theoretical chapter into examination of why such features found in 
the empirical chapter are explained by the literature, in particular game theoretical examination 
of XRO formation and development. 
 Contextual Classification of Case Studies  
The selection and methodology for investigation of the case studies was laid out in detail in 
previous reports in the first phases of the project. The European case studies are sited (with US 
case studies with European subsidiaries or offices) as seen in Figure 3(see below). We note that 
the case studies tend towards northern European examples, sited in Brussels, Geneva or five of 
the six largest economies in Europe (with the exception of Italy)43. Several case studies have their 
headquarters in the USA, but branch offices in Europe44.  
Note that our approach was not intended to be geographically representative, but to identify 
interesting practices as well as best practice, including especially those practices that have shown 
or inculcated the most innovation. As a result, and with our focus on XROs as opposed to co-
regulatory forms – which were covered in the media content sector by the Hans Bredow report 
for DG INFSO in 200645 and Oxford University Report for DG INFSO in 200446 – there is a 
focus on the earliest and most copied forms of XRO. This set up an interesting contrast between 
British and other European (notably German but also the Netherlands) forms of XRO. As the 
study intended to examine European institutions from a global perspective, and given the 
commercial Internet’s origins in the USA, we also examine a selection of XROs based there. It is 
particularly interesting that several pioneering XROs were founded in both the USA and Europe, 
notably the Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA) and the World Wide Web Consortium - 
W3C.   
                                               
43 Note that INHOPE is based in Dublin and marks the exception. 
44 SecondLife, Bebo, Creative Commons, IETF, W3C. 
45 Held and Scheuer (2006). 
46 Marsden (2005). 
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Figure 3: Selected XROs in Europe   
 
A particularly fascinating and forward-looking element in case study selection was to examine 
the new types of social organisational forms, for instance in virtual worlds (SecondLife), social 
networking (Bebo), and royalty-free copyright (Creative Commons). In all these cases, we 
examined institutions with significant European market and regulatory exposure. In the 
interviews, it was stressed that case studies were based on previously observed XRO practice. We 
can represent this figuratively in Figure 4. We discovered through the case study analysis that 
the XROs conformed to the categorisation we present in detail below. As shown in Figure 4, the 
cases were grouped according to substantive and institutional interconnectedness. 
Figure 4: XROs and their development and associations 
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 Financing and Budget of XROs 
The focus for evaluation in examining XRO funding is to establish whether the XRO is fully 
resourced, and the vital question of the extent to which funding dictates form and function. The 
range of funding of XROs is very broad, with several XROs essentially skeleton activities. 
Finance is an indication that an XRO has sufficient resource to operate to some effect. Figure 
5below illustrates the year of foundation and budget of XROs – in constructing the figure we 
estimated budgets for those organisations which declared staff numbers but not annual budgets. 
It reveals that the year of foundation of the XRO is not significant in its later budget, but its 
relationship to government and the degree to which it could be considered to be performing a 
vital function in the operation of markets were very important. 
Figure 5: Budget of XROs by year of foundation 
1986 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 20042003 2005 2006
€0.5million
€1million
€2million
€5million
€1.5m
€3million
€10million+
IETF
ICS
TIS
IWF
W3C
InHOPE
NICAM PEGI 
ICRA
FSM
KJM
Nominet ICANN
€100,000
ATVOD
IMCB
IGF
LAP
 
Typically, the main source of income is membership fees. These are supplemented by 
government (including EC) and corporate funders beyond fees as, for example, in hotline 
funding. In addition, sponsorships of events and other activities of XROs can form a major part 
of funding as, for example, in Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) meeting fees. Operational 
funding is an important item for XROs, including Pan-European Game Information (PEGI), 
Nominet and Netherlands Institute for the Classification of Audiovisual Media (NICAM), where 
their classification and other activities are charged on a per-item basis. 
It is clear that funding is, in many cases, minimal. Three categories of XROs present an 
exception to an overall picture of underfunded XROs: 
 market makers – XROs producing critical resources for markets, or those assumed to 
deliver a necessary function (historically) for that market to gain consumer acceptance, 
appeared better resourced. Examples included Nominet, Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), but also Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), as 
well as the standards bodies. They are paid for these functions and that income provides 
a stable resource base; 
 co-regulatory schemes – these received statutory backing for their resource demands on 
industry and therefore form a special category, but one might count these as a sub-
category of market makers declared essential to market formation by government: 
NICAM, ICSTIS and Kommission für Jugendmedienschutz (KJM) are examples. 
 market-funded – those organisations paid for volume of output in growing markets also 
secured resource based on market growth rather than membership fees, for example, 
Nominet as above, also ICSTIS, Family Online Safety Initiative (FOSI) and PEGI, and 
the standards bodies W3C and IETF, where membership increases with market 
participant increases. 
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Additionally, a strong theme emerging from interviews and a workshop was that ‘hidden 
resources’ play a powerful role in XROs, greater in relation to formal resources than in direct 
state regulation. These hidden resources came in three forms: direct member resources, self-
implementation activities by individual members, and third-party pro bono activities. Member 
resources devoted to the XRO’s direct activities were considered substantial in, for example, the 
work of ATVOD and EuroISPA (the latter not regulatory in function). Member resources devoted 
to self-implementation under XRO protocols include, for example, British Telecom’s Cleanfeed 
initiative, AOL’s hotlines and anti-abuse teams, and Bebo’s activities (the latter unregulated). 
Third-party resources devoted through pro bono activities included university and independent 
funding for IETF, W3C (both initially in any case), and Creative Commons. 
Also note that the selection for case studies all represented successful companies, either start-up 
or established businesses. Therefore, it represents the leading edge of Internet businesses rather 
than the broad membership of the thousands of companies involved in, for example, EuroISPA 
or Nominet membership. Interviewees with substantial experience of these environments 
stressed that many Internet companies have neither the resources nor the incentive to perform 
compliance functions beyond the bare minimum required. In particular, companies with no 
interest in avoiding users who are concerned with avoiding harmful content (and especially 
companies who have incentives to ensure wide viewership of content that may be offensive to 
some) will have no incentive to contribute to XROs whose mission this is: they may actively 
intend to expose unsuspecting users to challenging content. Therefore, the activities of a social 
network such as Bebo are not representative of the activities of the class of social networks, any 
more than is AdultfriendFinder, the first because their regulatory standards are designed for a 
particularly vulnerable sub-group, and the latter for the inverse, the explicitly adult ‘contact’ 
community47. 
In our examination of corporate governance below, we explore the extent to which the XRO is 
‘captured’ by the design of an independent funding council, or takes measures to widen its 
corporate governance to include non-executives who are also not corporate members, via 
advisory boards or government participation in some form. 
 Responsiveness and Flexibility of Self-regulation 
This chapter considers how XROs have responded to their environment and their general 
characteristics as a basis for that adaptation. The case studies could not investigate the founding 
of XROs as such, but the methodology was designed to examine the reform process for the light 
that could be shed on the original design and its fitness for purpose in response to changing 
circumstances.  
Note that many Internet XROs have founding ‘myths’: stories about the XRO origin that have 
developed over the period since its formation without empirical investigation or examination. 
Therefore we noted in the case studies the references to the histories of the XROs and focused in 
the interviews on what reform could reveal for reconsidering the foundation settlement of the 
XRO’s mission and form. In order to do so, we had to gain access to those who were present at 
foundation or at the key moments of reform of the organisation. In general we were successful, 
with interviewees active in the foundation of the institutions and continuing their association48.  
There appear to be two broad types of regime formation: emergency response and market-
forming. However, given the usual incentive problems in the formation of XROs, interviewees 
were asked why anyone but the incumbent would choose to be ‘first-mover’, and why would the 
incumbent run the risk of accusations of anti-competitive regime formation? Despite the risks of 
being considered anti-competitive (as expressed particularly in the Independent Mobile 
                                               
47 Note that AdultfriendFinder was the subject of a regulatory enforcement action by the US Federal Trade 
Commission on 7 December 2007 related to its intrusive advertising activities. 
48 Weitzner (W3C), Clark (IETF), Boyle (Nominet and ICANN), Benhamou (ICANN and IGF), Swetenham and Hoff 
(ICRA and INHOPE), Clayton, Hutty and Carr (IWF and EuroISPA), Callanan (INHOPE), Christiensen (KJM, FSM), 
Borthwick and Whiteing (IMCB), van Dijk and Bekkers (NICAM), Bekkers and Chazerand (PEGI), Millwood-
Hargrave (ATVOD), Ondrejka (SecondLife), Sahel (London Action Plan against Spam) and Kummer and Banks 
(IGF). We also interviewed those associated with Trustmark and social network site formation. The notable exception 
is ICSTIS as a 21-year-old co-regulator, but which published an ‘official’ history to mark its anniversary (ICSTIS 
2006). 
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Classification Board (IMCB) and EuroISPA case studies), the latter motive tends to dominate. 
This is considered further in theoretical terms in the main paper, but it is clear from the 
empirical evidence that such considerations are real, and the market actors are fully aware of the 
competition law consequences of their actions. 
How and why is reform undertaken? Substantial reform was observed in the XROs under 
examination, with method ranging over the very public (PEGI, Nominet, FOSI and European 
mobiles); to the very political (ICSTIS, ICANN, IWF, INHOPE); and the private (Association of 
Television on Demand – ATVOD, SecondLife, Bebo). 
The choice of approach was selected very deliberately by the XRO executive and membership, 
with regard to exogenous forces where these were felt to be particularly relevant – as in the 
public or political arenas chosen for reform discussion. The extent to which reform was 
undertaken with publicity of various kinds reflects the responsiveness of XROs to their wider 
policy environment: in general, the more the publicity, the greater a policy impact intended (note 
that this relates to the reform process, not the public unveiling of its results). 
The following chapters consider in turn the reasons for change, the type of change of scope of 
activities observed, changes in stakeholder involvement and the governance structure, in 
enforcement and compliance, and in less regulatory activities – reporting, media literacy and 
government relations. A further chapter then considers whether the XROs submitted to external 
evaluation, and measurement of public awareness of XROs, as a particular concern is the 
visibility of XROs to consumers.  
Internal Evaluation and Reforms Undertaken 
The case study XROs themselves identified via internal consultations and self-evaluation many 
requirements for reform during the study period. Some XROs saw no pressing need for 
structural reform, notably the standards organisations W3C and IETF. Others are of such recent 
vintage that reform could be seen as presumptuous without an opportunity for governance 
arrangements to ‘bed in’ – notably IMCB, London Action Plan (LAP), Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF) and Verein Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia-Dienstanbieter e.V. (FSM) 
search engine regulation. In these cases, the pressing requirement appears to be increased 
legitimacy and stakeholder acceptance through activity. 
Where reform was taking place during the survey months of June to September 2007, we 
identify types of reform relating to scope, stakeholders, governance structure, reporting, media 
literacy, government relations and external evaluations. These relate to the evaluation 
framework used for the individual case studies and the summary notes of those items which the 
XROs themselves considered important factors in their reform. To reiterate our methodology in 
the response to the terms of reference, the examination of reform during the survey period was 
intended to revisit the issue of regime formation, in that reform begs the question of prior and 
original institutional design. 
Scope of Activities 
Expansion of the scope of XROs included those of PEGI, IWF and Creative Commons, with 
change respectively to create PEGI Online, the IWF reforms to the Child Abuse Images and 
Content (CAIC) list use to block sites by ISPs, and new licences and activities for Creative 
Commons. Where reform took place, the scope extension was largely undertaken through 
existing resources or on the basis of projected resource increases associated with the new 
activities (membership increases, etc.). Expansion of scale (i.e. internationalisation) was seen in 
the PEGI and LAP examples, both with greater membership and activities outside Europe. 
Stakeholders 
Reform to encompass better third sector (charity, consumer, volunteer, user) input was seen in 
the new formal arrangements undertaken by FOSI in its reinvigorated advisory board, Nominet 
through its Best Practice Challenge, UK IGF through dynamic coalitions and IWF through 
outreach, but was explicitly rejected by the PEGI process in which end-users’ input was assumed 
to be included in member companies’ activities. For LAP and the standards bodies, such 
activities remained a matter of activity-based inclusion. In general, multi-stakeholderism was a 
matter of ad hoc consultation and web-based input rather than formal management structures. 
Where XROs decided on board structures with a majority of non-industry members, such as 
ICSTIS and IMCB, multi-stakeholderism could be considered to be institutionalised in the 
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method of governance chosen. However, given the ‘chameleon’ nature of many individuals in 
this area, with commercial, voluntary, academic and even government roles in their portfolio of 
interests, we caution that even the apparent exclusion or alternately the ‘hardwired’ multi-
stakeholder governance models may conceal a range of practices that are much more inclusive or 
exclusive respectively49. We note in particular the use of the XROs’ websites, listservs and other 
discussion lists to encourage a pluralistic response to consultations and ongoing activities as well 
as the use of instant reporting tools (hotlines, abuse buttons, etc.). 
Governance Structure 
Membership structures often affected the pace and direction of reforms. Telling examples are the 
‘veto’ on IWF reform posed by its funding council, and the need for a poll of the entire 
membership for fundamental Nominet reforms that affect any change to its original mission, 
both of which significantly balance any reformist executive proposal. By contrast, W3C features a 
particularly direct form of leadership which favours rapid reform. We note the particular cases of 
various types of ‘government advisory committees’ for PEGI, IGF and ICANN, and the difficulty 
in understanding how this formal role translates into the true influence of such committees. 
Typically, the government members interviewed believe that their real influence is overblown by 
non-members while civil society observers believe that it is greater than theirs – a case of mutual 
mistrust. 
The now long-established standards (IETF, W3C) and technical infrastructure (ICANN) bodies 
are accused by critics of being captured by their industry supporters, but can claim significant 
mandates from industry, government and users, acclaim for their technical expertise and 
widespread market adoption of their interoperable standards. Labelling (Trustmark) and rating 
(ICRA) schemes continue to show innovation, but are not well-known by the public or widely 
adopted by industry. 
                                               
49 Consider Tim Berners-Lee, an academic and director of W3C, with various other advisory board interests. The 
same may be said of many Internet Society (ISOC) directors and others. The multifaceted nature of many Internet 
advocate-experts is a great strength of the community, but such multi-tasking makes analysis more complex. 
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Table 4 shows the board composition and governance for the XROs – note that this cannot 
capture the complexity of ICANN, while several of the firm-level XROs are simply directors of 
private companies, and there is no requirement to grant independent directorships or any level 
of representation for user–civil society groups. Boards should exercise good corporate 
citizenship, and responsiveness to corporate social responsibility can exercise a level of 
governance and environmental (social and sustainable) consideration, absent even any 
acknowledgement of the regulatory agenda. 
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Table 4: Types of managing instrument in each XRO 
XRO Number of 
board directors 
Non-executives Independent 
funding 
board 
Advisory board Executives on 
board 
ICANN 15 plus 6 non-
voting 
Appointed by 
nominating 
committee 
No Yes President/CEO ex-
officio 
Nominet 2 executives and 4 
non-executives  
2 non-executives; 2 
others representing: 
8 nominated 
organisations; 8 
Nominet members 
Executive set 
budget; 
presented to 
board 
Policy and 
advisory body 
CEO 
IETF Administrative 
oversight 
committee 
IETF chair 
appointed by 
Internet 
Architecture Board 
(also sits on 
administrative 
oversight 
committee) 
 Internet 
architecture board 
selected by 
nominated 
committee; 
approved by ISOC 
trustees 
Administrative 
Director appointed 
by administrative 
oversight 
committee 
W3C   No Advisory board 
elected by 
members 
Director 
FOSI/ICR
A 
16 Majority No Advisory council: 
9 members 
CEO  
IWF 10 Yes Funding 
council  
Board of trustees CEO: executive 
committee of chair 
and 2 members 
INHOPE 4, including 
president and vice 
Board is executive No General assembly 
30 members 
No 
EuroISPA Governing council 1 per governing 
council member 
Treasurer  President 
KJM 12 delegated by state media authorities; 4 by state youth authorities; 2 by supreme 
federal authority for protection of minors 
Chair 
FSM 7 By FSM 
membership 
  Chair, managing 
director 
ICSTIS 10  Budget 
approve Ofcom 
15 on industry 
liaison panel 
Chair, chief 
executive 
ICMB 4 3 No Board co-opted 
from ICSTIS 
Chair, director 
NICAM 10 general and 
executive board 
 No Advisory 
committee 27 
members 
Independent chair  
PEGI 15   Advisory board Yes 
ATVOD 8 1 plus 2 special 
advisors 
No Board; 2 
independent 
advisors 
Run by chair 
SecondLife LindenLabs board: 
5 
  No CEO 
CC Board of founders   No CEO 
Bebo Board of directors   No CEO 
TRUSTe 17   No CEO 
Confianza  Board members come from member 
associations 
 Board Director 
LAP Ad hoc Not relevant Ad hoc  No No 
IGF Chair appointed by UN Secretary-General: 
no members 
No 47 member 
advisory group 
Secretariat to chair 
 Enforcement and Compliance  
The enforcement of the rules of XROs appears to be an area demanding continued scrutiny, 
and reform focuses on broader concerns than traditional command-and-control methods of 
enforcement. This makes it particularly difficult to assess the success of XROs and the 
effectiveness of their reform processes. Given the subtlety and flexibility of norms regarding 
to these organisations, enforcement amounts more often to compliance incentives: 
 moral censure; 
 expulsion or suspension of membership; or  
 market refusal to adopt the standard, filter, technique or Trustmark.  
None of these techniques should be underestimated: a reputation of bad faith attracted to a 
researcher or organisation in a standards body can undermine entirely their effectiveness, as 
much work relies on building alliances and persuading others of one’s cause. Equally, 
membership termination can be of great importance, ranging from expelling a member or 
removing a Trustmark from an organisation to suspending or terminating an individual’s 
membership of a social network or virtual world, as much ‘reputation capital’ may have been 
developed in friendship networks, recommendations and so on.  
Markets that do not adopt standards, distributors who ignore kitemarks and filtering 
guidelines, and consumers who do not trust the regulatory technique, make such XROs 
entirely redundant, a danger admitted by Trustmark organisations, standards bodies and 
filtering organisations alike. Indeed, their reforms often amount to trying to give teeth to 
previously created processes. A test of XRO effectiveness must be whether it has ‘shown its 
teeth’ to a member through some type of sanction broadly defined above: withdrawal of 
membership, censure for non-compliance, or an increased market use of and adherence to the 
standards of the technique used. The case studies and previous empirical research guide these 
findings. More extensive quantitative and qualitative research is needed into the methods and 
techniques used by Information Society XROs to maximise market and consumer knowledge 
and adoption of the proposed XRO solution. 
Reporting  
Reporting by XROs appears to be gaining greater importance in their reform agendas, as their 
importance is growing, and in general they are increasingly aware of the need for 
communication to the broader public. In addition to the ICANN example above (the exemplar 
with the IGF of international participation), many organisations held public meetings, 
including webcast meetings, to report on their work and discuss and receive views from the 
interested constituency, often including the general public50. It is clear that Internet XROs are 
good examples of reporting and public engagement, unsurprisingly using the Internet as a 
major source of distant communication without excluding the need for ‘live’ personal meeting 
opportunities. Where criticisms were made, they often related more to the overload of 
information available than the lack thereof. In particular, civil society stakeholders often 
claimed that simply keeping up with the volume of work produced by an XRO was a full-time 
job, and that it was impossible for both this group and many developing country and smaller 
country experts to stay informed of the vital activities of, for example, LAP, ICANN, IGF and 
other international regulatory mechanisms. This is an obvious resource gap that some XROs 
are attempting to cover by use of summaries, monthly bulletins and annual activities reports, 
recognising that many interested parties cannot keep up-to-date with the entirety of several 
XRO activities. 
Media Literacy  
Media literacy is an element of XRO activity which was continually stressed by the 
interviewees, including those not directly responsible for the XRO. Thus, notable efforts to 
engage with the public were stressed by XROs varying from standards-based (W3C) to 
                                                
50 Members of the RAND project team attended public meetings held by ICSTIS, Nominet, ISPA UK, PEGI, 
ICANN, IGF, IETF, LAP and FOSI in person during or immediately before the project, and invitation-only expert 
meetings with SecondLife, Creative Commons, W3C, ICSTIS, IMCB, TRUSTe, ATVOD, FSM, KJM and 
NICAM (the final four all at the German Presidency media self-regulation meeting in Leipzig, May 2007). 
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labelling (PEGI, FOSI, NICAM), and from hotline (INHOPE, KJM) to self-organising (Bebo, 
SecondLife, Creative Commons). These activities are dedicated resourced activities in addition 
to those of their members and the reporting-type expert or stakeholder meetings referred to 
above. However, we note that public knowledge of any of these bodies is extremely poor, and 
knowledge of the overall framework itself is weak. The Eurobarometer surveys commissioned 
by DG INFSO in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007 are an essential evidential contribution to public 
perceptions and knowledge of XROs51. 
Government Relations  
With regard to XRO engagement with government, we note the formal review of ICSTIS, 
NICAM and KJM, and requirements to appear before their Parliaments, as well as deliberate 
and extensive outreach by various bodies (e.g. Nominet, EuroISPA, IWF and PEGI) to both 
politician and government audiences. Many XROs in case studies were funded partially by the 
Safer Internet Action Plan (SIAP) and formal reviews (as well as financial and project 
reporting and continued informal engagement) took place during 2006/07. Therefore, there 
is significant government involvement in establishing and established XROs, which forms the 
basis for the ‘Beaufort Scale’ of XRO type which we constructed and is explained in chapter 
3.4 and Table 6 below. 
 External Evaluations 
Evaluations of XROs were limited to those that we class as co-regulatory, notably the entire 
German system for Internet co-regulation evaluated by Hans Bredow Institut and partners, 
NICAM’s ongoing evaluation52, the UK system for media self-regulation by Latzer, Price and 
Verhulst for Ofcom53, and the OneWorldTrust evaluation of ICANN. We also note the 
continued reflection on video co-regulation undertaken in connection with the future 
implementation of the Audio-Visual Media Services Directive, although this was only 
considered directly relevant to ATVOD. Several UK reform proposals referred to the UK 
Better Regulation framework (Nominet, ICSTIS) and the Cadbury corporate governance 
reform proposals (IWF, Nominet). ICANN continued its experiment with an ombudsman and 
appointed a public participation manager to encourage outreach to its constituency. 
The lack of individual resource per case study means that results are of necessity partial and 
only cautious conclusions can be drawn. However, the XROs themselves and stakeholders 
actively participated in the study and showed great willingness to engage with government in 
assessing more fully their individual and collective impact on trust and efficiency, among 
other goals, in the Information Society.  
A programme of such impacts has been carried out via independent research in several 
countries54, in addition to the independent evaluations carried out on behalf of SIAP and 
other DG INFSO activities (including for privacy and standard-setting policy). Several 
institutions have carried out evaluations of their processes or commissioned research to 
evaluate processes (notably ICANN and ICSTIS in our survey), as shown in Table 5 below. To 
end-2007, we found no independent evaluation of the emerging XROs: ATVOD, SecondLife, 
Bebo, Creative Commons, Trustmarks, LAP and IGF. 
Table 5: Independent evaluations carried out of case studies 
XRO Independent 
evaluation 
Organisation Government evaluation 
involvement 
Comments 
ICANN Yes College 
d’Europe 
Bruges 
(2003) 
College study 
funded by DG 
INFSO (Note: US 
Commerce 
Department formal 
Internal evaluations 
include OneWorldTrust 
(2007) on corporate 
governance and London 
School of Economics 
                                                
51 See Safer Internet For Children: Qualitative Study In 29 European Countries – Summary Report (2007), at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1227&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&g
uiLanguage=en 
52 See van der Stoel et al. (2005). 
53 Latzer et al. (2007) 
54 For example, Austria by Latzer et al. (2006), Germany by Hans Bredow (2007), UK by Latzer et al. for Ofcom 
(2007), and France by the Forum des Droits sur l’Internet on ongoing basis. 
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XRO Independent 
evaluation 
Organisation Government evaluation 
involvement 
Comments 
supervision of 
ICANN) 
(LSE 2005) on GNSO 
Nominet No  None formal Membership 
consultations on internal 
reforms of governance 
2007 
IETF No  None formal Internal governance 
mechanisms reformed 
with ISOC secretariat 
role 
W3C Yes DG INFSO Funding for 
European office 
Since 1996 
ICRA Yes SIAP DG INFSO Independent evaluators 
IWF Yes SIAP SIAP funding 
oversight 
DG INFSO – also 
independent governance 
reforms 
INHOPE Yes SIAP DG INFSO Independent evaluators 
EuroISPA No  Informal Lobby group 
KJM Yes Hans 
Bredow 
and 
partners 
Funded Independent evaluators 
FSM Yes Hans 
Bredow 
and 
partners 
Funded Independent evaluators 
ICSTIS Yes Ofcom Funded Ongoing 
IMCB No    
NICAM Yes Periodic 
scheduled 
Parliament 
commissioned 
Independent evaluators 
PEGI  SIAP  Independent evaluators 
Source: compilation from published sources 
It is clear that the necessity for evaluation of XROs in the Information Society must include 
the interaction between national, European and global initiatives, and interviewees welcomed 
the ambitious multi-sectoral and interdisciplinary approach taken in this survey which 
revealed, for instance, the connections in labelling between ICRA, NICAM, IMCB and PEGI 
on the one hand, and ICRA with ICANN (through FOSI’s interaction with the “.xxx” domain 
proposal), W3C and ultimately IETF and IGF, on the other hand.  
The interconnectedness of the various XROs was very much a feature that emerged from the 
elite interviews conducted. In part, this was due to the intermingling of personnel and the 
self-regulatory entrepreneurship of the founders of such XROs. It was claimed also to have 
resulted from the very powerful interconnectedness of the networking technologies used by 
these founders. In addition, there is a ‘small world’ phenomenon that particularly applied in 
the period before mass Internet adoption in the late 1990s. In the critical period of 1994–8 
when institutions such as W3C, ICRA, ICANN, INHOPE, IWF and FSM were discussed 
and/or founded, the personnel involved were often well known to each other. This ‘small 
world’ phenomenon has been less familiar since then, with reasons ranging from the 
departure of several founders into commercial companies in the late 1990s Internet and 
telecoms boom, the increasing specialisation and diversification of many key individuals in 
the early 2000s, and the collapse of Internet markets in the first half of the current decade. 
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Anthropological examination of the networks of founders and the development of the XROs 
could produce useful further empirical conclusions.  
Public Awareness of XROs 
Significant gaps appear to exist in public knowledge of even the best-resourced and most well-
known examples of Information Society self-regulation, and many case studies illustrate 
attempts at outreach and media literacy (notably ICSTIS, NICAM, IWF and KJM). Most 
members of the public appear to continue to believe that content should be reported to the 
police, government regulator or ISPs, for instance, rather than the various XROs. 
Gap Analysis 
The gap analysis purpose (of the mapping exercise and detailed examination of a 
representative and strategically chosen universe of case studies) is to identify the emerging 
environment for new topics and/or sectoral areas of regulatory and/or legislative interest. 
There are three potential outcomes: 
 that no gaps in regulation exist, with XROs and state regulation adequately providing 
rules in all areas; 
 that gaps exist which are claimed to be filled by XROs, but where there is insufficient 
evidence to demonstrate effective institutions to demonstrate effective regulation, 
either in institutional endowment or enforcement effectiveness; and 
 that there is significant uncertainty that gaps that do exist are filled by XROs or it is 
demonstrably the case that such gaps are unregulated except by general law, 
individual market actors and market actor or user behaviour (self-organisation rather 
than self-regulation). 
The first is clearly not the case in Internet regulation. The case studies indicate the second 
applied in relation to Internet content, classification, ratings, personal internet security and e-
commerce. The rise of Web2.0 content in the period since 2003 points to a further area where 
institutions do exist with potentially effective regulatory mechanisms, but which do not fit the 
classical model of a pan-industry XRO. In particular, the evidence demonstrated gaps in areas 
where emerging social, technical or economic trends create new ‘regulatory spaces’ to 
examine. The case studies demonstrated and evaluated the response of existing XROs to these 
evolving spaces. We identify areas in which there were gaps in either research, or more 
concretely formal XROs, and that means of enforcement for XROs in Internet-related topics 
are varied and often minimal.  
Taxonomy Gaps: A Classification of Situations and Levels of XRO organisation 
The IA strategy is not one-size-fits-all, and there are good reasons to build into it a degree of 
adaptability. For example, according to Table 5, an important part is the degree of self-
regulation. This helps us to understand better the types of XRO activities and government 
involvement therein which have proved effective or have been exemplified in the case studies. 
Note that only options 9, 10 and 11 represent co-regulation and therefore government 
legislative force to the regulatory forum, but the eight levels below provide a richness to the 
taxonomy that opens and exposes the techniques used in the ‘black box’ for some legislators of 
the XRO.  
Note that these approximate classifications do not relate to degree of government funding – 
the relationship between direct or indirect government funding is not consistent with policy 
involvement. For instance, government may choose to support a self-regulatory standard-
setting activity as a genuinely deregulatory policy, as in scales 5 and 6 above. That may 
include government financial support or co-funding, a policy approached vigorously by the 
SIAP since 1998. One can investigate whether such approaches are consistent with policy 
support via the failure of proposed policy interventions which sought to extend the role of 
such bodies. 
This extended classification, building on earlier work55, is necessary to finesse the distinctions 
between different self-regulatory bodies’ establishment and development. For instance, the 
                                                
55 E.g. Latzer et al. (2006), Schulz and Held (2004), PCMLP (2004). 
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insistence of PEGI that its establishment was “co-regulatory” demonstrates that it was 
different in approach to other types of self-regulatory forum. 
We recognise that both options 0 and 11 amount to exemplars that are found infrequently in 
practice – pure self-regulation with no prior or later approval amounts to a self-regulatory 
body that is close to invisible in practice, and it is certainly the case that only the very ‘early 
stage’ hybrid of self-regulation can be viewed in this space. Its doubtful and contested policy 
outcomes and process often reflect a highly politically uncertain environment, and thus it is 
perhaps unsurprising that politicians and bureaucrats do not intervene or even publicly 
comment on such manoeuvres. Nonetheless, these types are recognisable. 
Table 6: A ‘Beaufort Scale’ of self-regulation 
Scale Regulatory scheme Self–Co Government involvement 
0 ‘Pure’ unenforced self-
regulation 
Creative 
Commons 
SecondLife 
Informal interchange only – evolving partial 
industry forum building on players’ own terms 
1 Acknowledged self-
regulation 
ATVOD Discussion, but no formal recognition/approval 
2 Post-facto standardised 
self-regulation 
W3C# Later approval of standards 
3 Standardised self-
regulation 
IETF Formal approval of standards 
4 Discussed self-
regulation 
IMCB Prior principled informal discussion, but no 
sanction/approval/process audit 
5 Recognised self-
regulation 
ISPA Recognition of body – informal policy role 
6 Co-founded self-
regulation 
FOSI# Prior negotiation of body – no outcome role 
7 Sanctioned self-
regulation 
PEGI#  
Euro mobile 
Recognition of body – formal policy role 
(contact committee/process) 
8 Approved self-
regulation 
Hotline# Prior principled less formal discussion with 
government –with recognition/approval 
9 Approved compulsory 
co-regulation 
KJM# 
ICANN 
Prior principled discussion with government –
with sanction/approval/process audit 
10 Scrutinised co-
regulation 
NICAM# As 9, with annual budget/process approval 
11 Independent body (with 
stakeholder forum) 
ICSTIS# Government imposed and co-regulated with 
taxation/compulsory levy 
Note: # denotes ‘soft power’ of government/EC funding. 
 Policy Gaps: Innovation and Competitiveness 
The analysis of the case studies has shown that the lack of compulsion or state involvement 
has led to significant private or non-profit innovation in several sectors: Trustmarks; Social 
Networking Sites (SNS); virtual worlds; copyright. Sharing of global best practice between 
governments and other stakeholders has been seen from both top-down (IGF) and more 
heterarchical (LAP) initiatives. The problems of illegal and inappropriate content have led to 
significant private sector initiatives on individual company (i.e. BT Cleanfeed) and more 
sectoral levels (IMCB in mobiles, ATVOD in video on demand, FSM in search engine self-
regulation). Whereas network owners are active in building self-regulatory organisations, 
such as ATVOD, IMCB, IWF, KJM and others, content providers from a more ‘start-up’ 
culture continue to reply on their distinctive use-based and mediated self-organisation forms: 
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this is true of SecondLife, Bebo, Creative Commons and others. (We consider the general 
conclusion on ‘Regulation 2.0’ in concluding the main paper) 
The regulation of content in next-generation networks has been highlighted recently by 
several leading authoritative analysts of Internet regulation56. Although ‘net neutrality’ and 
the contractual relations between content providers and network owners are outside the scope 
of this study57, it is evident that significant tensions based on divergent business models and 
regulatory inheritances exist. The relationship between control via hardware and software of 
the end-user’s experience and that user’s ability to influence and control their own 
environment is not new but runs throughout the substantive issue areas described above. 
Zittrain (2006b: 254) states: 
“Control over software – and the ability of PC users to run it – rather than control 
over the network, will be a future battleground for Internet regulation, a battleground 
primed by an independently-motivated movement by consumers away from open, 
generative PCs and toward more highly regulable endpoint platforms.” 
These platforms are games consoles, mobile handsets and other ‘closed’ walled garden 
networks, where content access depends on network rules (both technical and economic). 
Whereas arguably the personal computer (PC) environment is becoming more open (with 
open source58 and free programmes and applications, peer-to-peer distribution59, and royalty-
free licensing60), the mobile and games environment remains largely subject to vertically 
integrated network operators. 
 Policy Gaps: Intellectual Property, Privacy, Freedom and Filtering 
The primary substantive concerns that arise from the regulation perspective remain those of 
balancing interests, a primarily political economic equation. These include the rights of 
intellectual property holders and the interest in innovation, and the right balance to strike for 
copyright and other rights in an evolving and more user-centred and generated innovative 
environment. Benhamou offers a considered analysis of these problems: 
 there is a need for transparency at technical interfaces;  
 anti-competitive dominance is a real concern, especially over scarce resources such as 
spectrum, numbering space and Application Programme Interfaces for dominant 
search engines. Search engine regulation must be transparent61. To him, a particular 
problem is the vertical integration of mobile devices with networks (e.g. lack of Wifi 
or third-generation (3G) functionality in the 2007 iPhone);  
 another concern is for “the need for a citizen-centric approach, which does not exist 
as there is no global view of the rights of the citizen online”62.  
The second such trade-off is between public interests in unfettered freedom of expression for 
Internet users, versus various public safety concerns including inappropriate and harmful 
content and ‘malware’ (spam, viruses, etc.) as well as criminal content or that promoting 
criminal activity.  
Further concerns arise in regards to entrepreneurial attempts to adapt their services to new 
commercial opportunities versus the interests of many users in maintaining a privacy opt-out 
from exposure of their personal information to either strangers or commercial presence. 
Intellectual property rights (IPR), freedom of expression, crime fighting and privacy are all 
policy fields in which government has substantial interest in maintaining sound policies for 
                                                
56 Bauer and Bohlin (2007), Faratin et al. (2007), Frieden (2007). 
57 See Marsden (2007). 
58 MacCormack et al. (2005) 
59 Mayer-Schönberger (2003). 
60 But also firewalls, the dominance of the Microsoft Windows family of operating systems and proprietary forms 
of digital rights management. 
61 He considers National Science Foundation (2004) to be important in this regard. 
62 Benhamou (2007: interview with Marsden 4 September). An example is privacy and control of information. He 
takes Spock.com is an example of new metasearch people sites – using LinkedIn public information. He considers 
that Open ID – a new form of federated identity – creates possibilities for interoperability to create ‘Big Brothers’ 
on a federated data level. 
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public benefit, and none of these fields can be left to self-regulation without continually 
refreshed IA and review of the public interest.  
Comparisons with non-Information Society XROs may prove useful in analysing this type of 
risk-based regulation. The balancing of costs and benefits in technologically sophisticated 
regulatory environments with strong public interests is highly politically-charged, and the 
case studies considered are the regular subject of mass media interest in censorship and the 
Internet. Innovation in XROs in areas of both complex technology and profound citizen 
ethical interest has been undertaken in biotechnology (e.g. in the case of genetically modified 
crops), biomedicine (human embryology), environmental protection and nuclear safety. The 
idea of engaging experts with citizens directly in such cases, with the immediate emotive mass 
media reporting of these topics, has been broadly evaluated. The ‘technocratic’ tendency for 
such regulation to be dominated by experts has been severely criticised in the Internet context 
and clearly cannot operate outside the normative political framework63. Furthermore, absent 
some level of government supervision, self-regulation is coming under serious challenge. 
National government control over the Internet was never a feasible option64 without 
international negotiation and compromise65. Regional and global regulation begs questions of 
trade66 as well as competition and human rights obligations. The future of Internet self-
regulation at the international level has been widely considered67.  
There are substantial analytical gaps in our assessment and evaluation of Internet XROs in 
comparison with other sectoral regulation, and with emerging opportunities and threats from 
technologies within the Internet environment itself. 
 Institutional Gaps 
Institutionally, we identify significant innovations, but also increasing resource constraints on 
XROs. Adoption of the multi-stakeholder paradigm and the inclusion of user interests are 
increasing from a low base, encouraged by the minimal co-regulation involved in government 
monitoring and supervision of such multi-stakeholder discussions, as well as more formal 
policy tools including funding and support for such activities. The introduction of formal 
appeal mechanisms, ombudsmen and formal opportunities for dialogue, as well as open 
consultations, is also increasing. As expected, the use of online discussion fora is well-
developed and public participation via this means (short of e-voting) is flourishing. Both 
government and civil society have a role here in ensuring maximum transparency and 
effectiveness of decision-making, while maintaining high standards of efficiency in 
implementation of the XRO goals.  
Budgets for XROs are often very low by government regulatory standards, which may prove 
either:  the greater efficiency of the private sector; resource gaps to ensure maximum 
transparency and good governance; or that the true costs of XROs lie in the individual and 
combined members’ activities, both in serving the XRO directly and in the policies adopted at 
the individual company/service level.  
Differences in trans-Atlantic approaches towards self-regulation are a strong feature of 
Internet self-regulation68. Newman and Bach identify the mid-way between US-style ‘market 
regulation’ and European ‘carrot-and-stick’ public involvement in self-regulation69. We 
                                                
63 As explained by Dommering (2006) and Greenstein (2006). 
64 Odlyzko (2000). 
65 Mayer-Schonberger and Ziewitz (2007). 
66 Wu (2006). 
67 E.g. Börzel (2000), Goldsmith and Wu (2006), Wu (2006). 
68 Newman and Bach (2004: 388) state that: “In the U.S., the government induces self-regulation largely through 
the threat of stringent formal rules and costly litigation should industry fail to deliver socially desired outcomes. 
Industry thus views self-regulation as a pre-emptive effort to avoid government involvement. The relationship 
between the public and private sector is spotty, formal and frequently adversarial. We label the ideal-typical U.S. 
model legalistic self-regulation.” By contrast, they claim that the European Union makes wider use of ‘soft 
powers’ (Duina 1999) of funding, recommendation, best practice sharing and coordination: “In Europe, public 
sector representatives meet with industry and agree on a joint course of action. Here, private and public sectors 
view each other as partners in an often-informal self-regulatory process. Co-ordinated self-regulation is the term 
we use to describe the European ideal-typical model.” 
69 Newman and Bach (2004: 392). They state: “The public sector has greater carrot capacity if it can offer financial 
and logistical incentives to bring about sustained participation of organized private interests in the regulatory 
process. Toward the high end of a scale is its ability to formally delegate regulatory authority to organized private 
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recognise from the case studies these differing uses of carrots and sticks, and the coordinated 
self-regulation approach as particularly applied by the European Commission. These 
approaches are worthy of further analysis and development, which we undertake in Chapters 
4–5. 
 Enforcement and Compliance Gaps 
We identified several classes of XRO for which enforcement of rules is either unproven or of a 
type which is non-binding, and which conform to the upper levels (0–4) in the ‘Beaufort 
Scale’. The following categories lack effective enforcement: 
 XROs of recent standing that have no record, or a very limited record, of taking 
enforcement action against parties that breach rules which includes, for instance, new 
Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) XRO ATVOD, as well as ICANN in its 
enforcements against rogue registrars; 
 standards bodies for whom enforcement is via patent, and is voluntary in that it is 
market actors’ decision whether to apply for permission to use the standard; 
 norm-setting international or national organisations whose advice consists of 
opinions or codes of conduct whose implementation is considered to be ‘best 
practice’, but which is entirely voluntary: for instance, Internet exchanges such as the 
London Internet Exchange (LINX) and ISP associations; and 
 bodies with no formal membership and/or only individuals with standing, and 
therefore not even the limited sanction of expulsion of members, whose enforcement 
is at best a matter of moral suasion and a refusal to sanction participation: for 
instance, IGF or IETF. Here, the sanction is future non-cooperation and publicity 
which is unflattering to the individual or organisation. 
The potential challenges to effective functioning of markets, and therefore competition law 
issues in self-regulation, are well known70. On a narrow reading of regulation in terms of 
enforcement, the XROs above may be considered to have no regulatory power, or as merely 
talking shops or lobbies, and therefore pose no such competition issues. However, as Lessig71 
famously illustrated, a narrow legalistic view of regulation draws a clear line in enforcement, 
but fails entirely to acknowledge the less formal yet more influential and pervasive influence 
of decisions made in other fora, which are habitually followed or noted by the Internet 
community affected. Continued research into the potential for such adoption has been further 
identified by, for instance, ENISA72 in its examination of social networks, and the Office of 
Fair Trading (2007a)73 in the case of trust in e-commerce, and more is urgently required. 
 Methodological Gaps in the Study 
The Internet survey has provided very valuable information. However, a significant number of 
correspondents failed to complete all questions in each area, which reduces the possibility for 
comparison and cross referencing of findings. As a demanding survey in terms of accuracy of 
detailed knowledge required of participants, this was anticipated. To illustrate this: 
interviewees who were asked to examine (or where possible complete) the survey prior to the 
interview, in several cases explained during the interview that they could not complete several 
categories of questions in the survey. This may illustrate both the survey’s demanding nature 
and the lack of intimate knowledge of self-regulatory organisations – even by their 
participants. In fact, particularly in the case of budgets, respondees exhibited very little 
knowledge, with only two of 19 respondees answering regarding the W3C (an 11% rate); they 
gave separate answers of either $200,000 or $5,000,000 per annum budget. Therefore, this 
type of response was not especially illuminating, except inasmuch as it revealed the expected 
                                                                                                                                       
interests and/or to make industry rules enforceable in the courts, an arrangement... aptly called “private interest 
government.” 
70 Joskow and Noll (1999: 1252) state: “[R]egulation must accord rights of participation and policy review to 
anyone substantially affected by its policies, which invites strategies and tactics that, at best, retard the competitive 
process and, with depressing frequency, invite cartelization.” 
71 Lessig (1999). 
72 ENISA (2007). 
73 Office of Fair Trading (2007a). 
  
 58
lack of detailed knowledge of XROs74. That suggests that only detailed researched and audited 
examination of such institutions can explain the functioning of the institution.  
The more informal surveys of participant behaviour evidenced in chat fora run by, for 
instance, the standards organisations (as well as best practice in ICANN, IGF, Creative 
Commons, SecondLife, SNS and so on) can give a better indication of activist opinion on 
present issues. However, for a truly representative user sample, one would need the resources 
of Eurobarometer, World Internet Project or an equivalent commercial market research 
organisation. Such a user survey is an urgent research requirement in view of the evidence 
examined during this project. 
 Conclusion: XRO Case Studies and Impact Assessment Implications 
In regards to impact assessment, we can state – subject to our further analysis of cross-cutting 
issues and relevance to i2010 and competitiveness agendas – that the model used produces an 
essential dilemma which will be familiar to Internet regulatory policy experts. The questions 
asked of XROs and experts reveal significant and often constructive tensions in the role and 
reform of the XROs, and the proper role for both XRO and government intervention. 
Unsurprisingly, there are no easy answers or ‘magic bullets’. 
This short summary and analysis concisely explained the outcomes from the most intensive 
part of this project: the examination of 21 XRO case studies. It explained the contextual 
classification of the selected XROs, the financing and budgets for XROs, the dynamics of XRO 
development as observed in the empirical phase of the project, and a gap analysis to examine 
the substantive and emerging features of the Internet environment. Finally, it contextualised 
these findings within their implications for IA. Finally, we recall the need for aggregated 
analysis to produce meaningful evaluation of Information Society XROs. The main paper 
analyses the cross-cutting theoretical lessons from the case studies against the features 
identified in this summary descriptive chapter.  
                                                
74 For instance, of 19 respondees on W3C, only three believed that they knew the identity of the chief executive. 
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